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INTRODUCTIONT HE "federalism revolution" under Chief Justice Rehnquist's
leadership has been the subject of considerable discussion
among both legal scholars and political scientists. Some legal com-
mentators have suggested that the Court has invalidated federal
action in order to protect state sovereignty By contrast, political
scientists routinely argue that ideology, rather than federalism, can
best explain the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices.2
In a recent article, Professors Ruth Colker and James Brudney
dispute the proposition that the Rehnquist Court invalidates fed-
'See, e.g., Mitchell S. Lustig, Rehnquist Court Redefines the Commerce Clause,
224 N.Y. hJ. 1 (2000) (describing the new mantra of the Rehnquist Court as "the
Tenth Amendment and States' Rights"); Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel, Supreme
Court Wrap-Up: U.S. Supreme Court 1999-2000 Term Review, 161 N.J. UJ. 709
(2000) (describing the Court as responding to "direct attacks on state sovereignty");
see also Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication:
The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev.
953 (2000) (condemning the Court's expansion of governmental immunity); Robert F.
Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 643 (1996) (arguing that
the Court's states' rights decisions do not signal a shift in federal-state relations); John
C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (1997)
(arguing that the Court's "political safeguards" approach to judicial review and state
sovereignty endangers state protection of individual rights).
2 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model (1993) (contending that a Justice's votes may be predicted based
on his or her ideology); Sue Davis, Rehnquist and State Courts: Federalism Revisited,
45 W. Pol. Q. 773 (1992) (arguing that conservative ideology dictates Chief Justice
Rehnquist's votes); Harold J. Spaeth, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: An Assessment,
in An Essential Safeguard: Essays on the United States Supreme Court and its
Justices 81, 94-95 (D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. ed., 1991) (assessing Justice O'Connor's
ideology, as evidenced by her votes); Harold J. Spaeth, The Judicial Restraint of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter-Myth or Reality, 8 Midwest J. Pol. Sci. 22 (1964) (arguing that
judicial decisions result from a Justice's stance on public policy issues). For further
discussion, see infra Section I.E.
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eral legislation primarily to protect state sovereignty! Instead, they
argue that these invalidations reflect, in part, the desire of the so-
called "federalist" Justices4-namely, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy-to assert more
power for the Court at the expense of Congress by defining the
substantive meaning of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment in an ideologically conservative way.'
Discussion of the Rehnquist Court by legal scholars has mostly
focused on whether the Court's treatment of federal action has
been consistent with a federalism agenda. Two important consid-
erations have been largely absent from that discussion:
(1) consideration of the Rehnquist Court's repeated invalidation of
state laws or actions, and (2) consideration of whether the deci-
3 Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L Rev. 80,-84 (2001). For
other commentary that offers alternatives to the federalism explanation, see A. Christopher
Bryant & Tnothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the
Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 Cornell L Rev. 328 (2001); William W.
Buzbee & Robert A. Shapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 Stan. L Rev. 87 (2001).
4 We label these Justices federalists (on a provisional basis) because they constitute a core
of Justices who have consistently used the Eleventh Amendment to invalidate federal action,
purportedly to protect state sovereignty. They have frequently formed a five-vote majority to
invalidate federal action. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (5-4 vote);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (same); United States v. Morrison, 529 US.
598 (2000) (same); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (same); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (same); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (same). Assuming that these Justices' votes on cases involving federal
action are consistent with federalism, we are asking whether their votes on cases involving
state action are consistent with federalism. By contrast, we label as nonfederalists Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Breyer, Ginsburg, Marshall, Souter, and Stevens. We also generally
consider Justice White to be a nonfederalist because he voted with the "nonfederalist" bloc
on most cases outside the abortion context during the 1991 and 1992 Terms. See infra note 83.
1 See Colker & Brudney, supra note 3, at 111. Although Professors Colker and Brudney
do not call that substantive view "ideological conservatism," we believe that label
describes the Court's decisions in the equal protection cases most accurately. We will
discuss the expression of the Rehnquist Court's political conservatism in Part III,
focusing some attention on how the Court has articulated a conservative ideology in
both the federal and state action cases.
6 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky hints at such an analysis when he contrasts Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531 US. 98 (2000), with her opinion in other federalism
cases. Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice O'Connor and Federalism, 32 McGeorge L. Rev. 877,
892 (2001). He observes:
The conclusion is that federalism is a value that the conservative Justices, including
Justice O'Connor, invoke when it advances their conservative agenda. Justice
O'Connor, and the other four Justices who join her, want to limit federal power, as
1304
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sions in those cases can be described on ideological rather than (or
in addition to) federalism grounds.7 We believe that examination of
the Court's record8 of invalidating state action9 can offer added in-
conservatives generally do. Federalism is the guise for doing this. But in Bush v. Gore,
where the conservative Justices wanted to see George W. Bush prevail, federalism was
given no weight whatsoever. Justice O'Connor's vote in Bush v. Gore speaks volumes
as to what her commitment to federalism is really all about
Id. Professor Chemerinsky, however, follows other commentators in focusing nearly
exclusively on the cases involving the validity of federal law to determine whether the
Court is acting consistently with federalism. Id. at 879-85.
A few commentators have examined the ideological underpinnings of some of the
"federalists." See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, The Limitations of Labeling: Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy and the First Amendment, 20 Ohio N.U. L Rev. 225 (1993) (arguing that
Justice Kennedy's decisions cannot be easily categorized on partisan or ideological grounds);
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character. The Moral Agendas of Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, 49 Rutgers L Rev. 219 (1996) (describing the non-process
values that motivate the conservative bloc).
Justice O'Connor's decisions have been particularly subject to discussion on ideological
grounds. See, e.g., Richard A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment, The Emerging
Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor, 52 U. Chi. L Rev. 389, 423-36 (1985) (documenting
Justice O'Connor's federalist views); Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelson, Sandra Day
O'Connor. A Justice Who Has Made a Difference in Constitutional Law, 32 McGeorge L
Rev. 915 (2001) (discussing Justice O'Connor's impact on the Court's decisions); Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L Rev.
543,592-616 (1986) (hypothesizing that Justice O'Connor's feminist perspective might result
in a feminist jurisprudence); Spaeth, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. An Assessment, supra
note 2, at 94-95 (arguing that Justice O'Connor's votes illustrate a conservative ideology).
8 In order to collect the legal decisions that we studied for this Essay, we examined several
sources. First, we obtained a list of decisions from the Congressional Research Service in
which CRS concluded that the Court had invalidated state constitutions, statutes, or
municipal ordinances. This list, however, only included invalidations of state action. We also
wanted to study validation of state action. For that purpose, we used the Supreme Court
Database contained on the website of the Michigan State University Program for Law and
Judicial Politics at httpi/www.ssc.msu.edulpljp/sctdatal.html. We also used the Supreme
Court Database to ascertain the ideological direction of the underlying state action: If for
example, the Supreme Court's decision was conservative and invalidated the state action,
then we coded the underlying state action as liberal. In addition, we checked our results
against a list of cases involving invalidation of state action listed in a well known political
science publication. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court Compendium: Data,
Decisions, and Developments 162-74 (2d ed. 1996). Finally, to account for decisions from the
past year, which are not yet included in these sources, we examined every decision in the
most recent volumes of the United States Reports to determine what recent cases involved
the question of the validity of state action. For each of the secondary sources that we used,
we found errors in those sources that we corrected, such as incorrect citations, incorrect
characterizations of the major issue in a case or an incorrect statement of the lower court
holding.
9 For the purposes of this Essay, "state action" includes cases in which the Court is
asked to invalidate action taken at the city or county level, as well as directly by the
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sight into whether the "federalism" label and/or the "conserva-
tive"'1 label properly applies to the Rehnquist Court."
In addition to intervening to resolve the Florida election dispute
in Bush v. Gore,'2 the Rehnquist Court invalidated state action on
state, as violative of the United States Constitution. Because we understand
federalists to believe that decisions can often be best made at the local government
level as opposed to the national level, we believe this definition best helps us
understand whether a federalism perspective can explain the Rehnquist Court's
record of invalidating governmental action. The cases involving cities and counties,
however, represent less than 10% of the cases the Rehnquist Court has considered, so
we do not believe that this definition of "state action" has affected our results
significantly.
For the purposes of this Essay, we have also excluded certain cases that arguably
could be included within the meaning of "state action" because they would not
contribute to meaningful results for our purposes. Thus, we have excluded cases in
which the Court did not reach a decision on the merits--such as cases involving
standing, mootness, and justicability-because the Court did not reach the substantive
constitutional issues in these cases. In addition, we have excluded cases involving
states as both plaintiffs and defendants because, by definition, the Court had to
choose a state as the winner (and loser), and these cases cannot inform us as to the
Court's predisposition to invalidate state action on ideological or federalist grounds.
10 The term "conservative" has multiple meanings. For an excellent survey of those
multiple meanings, see Gottlieb, supra note 7, at 223 n-3. The term "conservative" can
include moral conservatives, economic conservatives, and traditional conservatives-
those who simply stress caution. Id. For the purposes of this Essay, however, we use
the term "conservative" in the moral or economic sense because those are the
meanings employed in political science. For further discussion, see infra note 57.
11 As a theoretical matter, we believe that a pure "federalist" should be ideologically
neutral. See infra note 55. As a practical matter, however, we recognize that some
people might argue that one can be both a federalist and a conservative. We have
separated those labels to see if one or both of them apply to the so-called "federalists"
on the Rehnquist Court.
12531 U.S. 98 (2000). We do not consider Bush v. Gore to be an example of the
Court invalidating state action because its holding in that case technically affirmed the
result certified by Florida's Secretary of State. The case, however, was very difficult to
categorize for our purposes. The Court did conclude that Florida violated equal
protection principles by counting votes without a clear, uniform standard but refused
to remand the case to the Florida courts because it found that Florida law required
that the counting be completed by December 12, 2000. Id. at 109, 110-11.
Nonetheless, the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore did result in an unprecedented
interference with a state's election process and, for that reason, has generally been
seen as an example of conservative activism on the part of the Court. See, e.g., Jack
M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics. 110 Yale L.J.
1407, 1432 (2001) (criticizing the Court for accepting certiorari in Bush v. Gore);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1093
(2001) (arguing that the Court should have used self-restraint and not granted
certiorari). Some commentators have tried to explain why the Court was entitled to
interfere in a state election process. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as
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fourteen occasions during the 1999-2000 Term13 and on thirteen
occasions during the 2000-2001 Term. Two or more federalist Jus-
tices joined the majority in all but one of the invalidation decisions
during those two terms.'
the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 613 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon To An
Assessment, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719 (2001); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's
Legitimacy, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (2001). Other commentators have suggested that
Congress could have resolved the election dispute without a constitutional crisis and
that the Court was wrong to end the recounting process. See, e.g., Michael W.
McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657 (2001);
see also Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 637 (2001)
(arguing that the Court should have used self-restraint and not resolved the election
dispute itself). Nonetheless, for purposes of our study, we did not consider Bush v.
Gore to be an example of the Supreme Court invalidating state action.
2 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (5-4 majority included only Justice
O'Connor); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (5-4 majority included all
five federalist Justices); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (7-2
majority included all five federalists); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (5-4 vote
included Justices Scalia and Thomas); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363 (2000) (9-0 vote); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (6-3
majority included Justices O'Connor and Kennedy); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000) (6-3 majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor; Justice
Thomas concurred in the result); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (54 majority
included Justices Scalia and Thomas); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (9-0 vote);
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (9-0 vote); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562 (2000) (9-0 vote); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (7-2 majority
included all five federalists); Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458
(2000) (9-0 vote); Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999) (9-0 vote).
14 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (6-3 majority included all five
federalist Justices); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (54 vote included
all five federalists); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (6-3
majority included all five federalists); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (6-3
majority included Justices O'Connor and Kennedy); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514 (2001) (6-3 vote included Justices O'Connor and Kennedy); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,
532 U.S. 141 (2001) (7-2 majority included all five federalists); Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (6-3 majority included Justice O'Connor; Justice
Kennedy concurred in the result); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (7-2
majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor);
Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001) (9-0 vote; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor concurred in the result); Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) (9-0 vote);
Buckman v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (9-0 vote; Justices Stevens
and Thomas concurred in the result); Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (9-0 vote);
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (6-3 vote included Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy).
15 Supra notes 13-14.
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Since the 1991 Term, when Justice Clarence Thomas's addition
to the Court created a five-vote federalist majority, the Court in-
validated state action in 111 of the 203 (54.7%) cases in which it
granted certiorari. 6 The 1991-2000 invalidation rate is comparable
to the invalidation rate of the supposedly activist Warren era, 7
when the Court invalidated state action in 128 of 239 (53.6%) cases
in which it granted certiorari. From this perspective, the Rehnquist
Court is as activist as the Warren Court. 8 Preliminarily, these fig-
ures suggest that the Rehnquist Court is not primarily acting on the
basis of a strong version of judicial restraint when cases involve the
validity of state action.9
In this Essay, we will try to determine which factors predict a
vote by members of the Rehnquist Court to invalidate state ac-
16This data includes the period between the 1991 Term and the 2000 Term. As
mentioned previously, "state action" includes cases in which the Court is asked to
invalidate action taken at the city or county level, as well as directly by the state.
Supra note 9. It also includes both legislative and executive action by governmental
officials. For an excellent discussion of the transformation of the Court from 1986,
when Justice Rehnquist became Chief Justice, to 1991, when Justice Thomas joined
the Court, see generally David Savage, Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist
Supreme Court (1992). For an account that disputes that a conservative revolution
has occurred under Chief Justice Rehnquist's leadership, see James F. Simon, The
Center Holds (1995). Writing in 1995, however, Professor Simon may have missed the
most important period under Chief Justice Rehnquist's leadership and predicted too
soon that the Court would be moderate in its decisions.
17 For an excellent discussion of the decisions of the Warren Court, see The Warren
Court: A Retrospective (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996). In writing about the Warren
Court's decisions in the area of racial equality, Professor Julius Chambers argued: "It
simply cannot be denied, however, that the decisions of the Warren Court in the area
of race revolutionized our society by beginning in earnest the ongoing challenge to
eliminate, root and branch, the ugly vestiges of American slavery." Julius Chambers,
Race and Equality: The Still Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, in The
Warren Court, supra, at 21.
"IWe recognize that this is at best an imperfect comparison given substantial
differences in subject matter over this broad time period.
19 A conventional definition of federalism would require that a federalist Justice be
both neutral ideologically and restrained judicially. See infra Part I. Hence, some
might argue that a Justice is not a "true" federalist if he or she invalidates state action
to protect conservative political values even if that Justice also invalidates state action
to protect separation of powers principles. In this Essay, we will discuss federalism as
being comprised of five components-judicial restraint, respect for policies that are
important to the state, protection of separation of powers principles, protection of
voting rights, and neutral ideology-so that we can determine if Justices fit some but
not all of these criteria for federalism.
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tion.2' To this end, we will look at the voting practices of individual
Justices, paying particular attention to the federalists. We will use
quantitative ' and qualitative analysis to make that assessment.'
Ultimately, this Essay strives to answer the following questions:
Are the federalists more restrained than the nonfederalists on the
Rehnquist Court? Is their conduct in invalidating state action con-
sistent with the basic tenets of federalism?
In Part I, we will define "federalism" and create an empirical
model to test for the presence of that philosophy. Defining federal-
ism, particularly in the context of cases involving state action,
proved to be a difficult exercise. The majority of the literature on
federalism focuses on the Court's proper role in invalidating con-
gressional action when Congress allegedly interferes with the rights
of the states.n Fewer commentators focus on the Court's proper
role in invalidating state action when states allegedly interfere with
the rights of the individual. Should a federalist Justice protect state
sovereignty and the right of the states to make their own policies,
even if those policies allegedly violate the rights of the individual?
Should a federalist protect state sovereignty by deferring to the de-
2 We have only examined judicial philosophy as applied to Supreme Court Justices.
Although these categories may also apply to lower court judges, precedent should
play a greater role in predicting the votes of lower court judges and might mediate the
effect of a judge's judicial philosophy on voting behavior, and our our model will
therefore be less useful in predicting the votes of lower court judges. Hence, we
confine our analysis in this Essay to the Justices of the Supreme Court.
21 In order to engage in quantitative analysis, we coded the votes of individual
Justices in cases in which the Court had to decide whether to invalidate state action
during the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. We also coded the characteristics
of these cases such as whether the lower court was a state or federal court, whether
the Supreme Court decision was liberal or conservative, whether the Supreme Court
invalidated the government action under review, whether the lower court invalidated
the government action, and whether various amid participated in the case by filing
briefs with the Supreme Court. Our complete regression results are contained in the
Appendix.
2 For a detailed discussion of our quantitative methodology, see infra Part II. Our
qualitative approach is described infra Part III.
2" See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Justice Kennedy's Vision of Federalism, 31 Rutgers L.J.
761, 770 (2000) (arguing that Justice Kennedy's endorsement of state sovereignty in
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), "has a hollow ring"); Robert F. Nagel, Judges
and Federalism: A Comment on "Justice Kennedy's Vision of Federalism," 31
Rutgers L.J. 825, 827-28 (2000) (attributing Justice Kennedy's lack of support for
state rights to attitudes towards authority inherent in judging).
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cisions of a state's highest court? Should a federalist only protect
state sovereignty when Congress has overstepped its authority by
interfering with the rights of the states? In this Essay, we will not
take a position on the question of which of these models might re-
flect the proper definition of federalism. Instead, we will create
multiple criteria for defining federalism that reflect each of these
models. Hence, our Essay can retrospectively reflect on what federal-
ism might mean for each of the so-called federalists, while recognizing
that there is not universal agreement on the definition of federal-
ism in the context of invalidating state action.
In Part II, we will use quantitative methods to assess which ver-
sion of federalism, if any, helps explain the voting behavior of the
federalists. First, we will present our data generally through bivari-
ate analysis. Then, we will perform multivariate analysis to
determine which results are statistically significant and assess quan-
titatively how the presence of various factors changes the results.
In Part fIi, we will use qualitative methods to assess the judicial
philosophy of the federalists on the Rehnquist Court by examining
the opinions in which they voted as a bloc. This discussion will
permit us to consider the influence that issues and ideology may
have on the votes in a particular case by contrasting the votes of
federalists with the votes of the "nonfederalists."24 Our qualitative
analysis reinforces the quantitative findings, particularly for Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, by demonstrating that her decisions do not
follow a consistent ideological thread.
We will conclude by asking whether the "federalism" label
properly describes the voting behavior of the so-called federalists
on the Rehnquist Court. We find that there is more than one ver-
sion of federalism operating for members of the Rehnquist Court.
Justice Thomas, and to a lesser extent Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, for example, are acting under principles of both fed-
eralism and conservatism. On the one hand, their versions of
federalism may be restraining them from upholding the validity of
state action; on the other hand, their conservative activism may be
24We tried to conduct this kind of analysis by looking quantitatively at the
interaction effects between ideology and issues, but we found that issue coding was
too inaccurate to yield reliable results, especially in light of the small number of cases
within each issue category.
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causing them to invalidate state action. Our findings indicate that
Justice Scalia's voting record became more strongly significant on
an ideologically conservative basis after Justice Thomas joined the
Court in 1991. The voting records of Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor are not predictable on an ideological basis. They also
operate under different versions of federalism.
This investigation, in itself, does not demonstrate that any of the
so-called federalists are not truly federalists. It does suggest, how-
ever, that one lasting legacy of the Rehnquist era may be to
redefine federalism so as to include activism on behalf of a conser-
vative political agenda. It also suggests that the term "federalism,"
as used by the Rehnquist Court, is an incoherent label because at
least four different versions of federalism could be linked to the so-
called federalists on the Rehnquist Court.
I. FEDERALISM
In this Part, we review the literature on federalism to construct a
model of federalism that we can test empirically. Because there is
not one agreed-upon model of federalism, we have decided to
break the concept of federalism into five components: judicial re-
straint, respect for policies that are important to the states, respect
for separation of powers, protection of voting rights, and "ideologi-
cal neutrality."
A. Restraint
The conventional definition of federalisme supports a limited
judicial role.' Some authors argue that the courts should have lir-
21 For an explanation for our inclusion of "ideological neutrality," see supra note 19. Our
rationale for choosing these five factors is discussed when we describe each factor
individually. See infra Sections I.A.-I.E.
26The Federalist Society has a web page on which it offers suggested reading
for pre-law students. See The Conservative & Libertarian Pre-Law Reading
List: An Introduction to American Law for Undergraduates and Others,
http:llwww.fed-soc.orglPublicationslreadinglistlreadinglist.htm (last visited on May
13, 2002). We used that web page to identify authors whose work is central to a
federalist perspective. Each of the authors we discuss in Part I is highlighted
prominently on the Federalist Society web page.
2 While most federalists argue that the Court should act with restraint, some
federalists support an activist role for the Court. For example, Scott Fruehwald
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ited judicial powers to protect separation of powers principles, irre-
spective of whether the underlying action is state or federal. Other
authors argue that the courts might have a proper activist role in
ensuring that Congress does not interfere with state sovereignty
but that the courts should nonetheless be restrained in reviewing
actions by state governments. Both sets of authors, however, agree
that the courts should be reluctant to use their power to interfere
with state action.
Professors Herbert Wechsler and Alexander Bickel ' hold the
first view. Professor Wechsler, for example, believes in the impor-
tance of federalism but does not identify the courts as having an
important role in implementing a federalist vision.'9 Under this ver-
recently praised what he described as the "new judicial activism" as "a healthy
reaction to the Court's previous failure to police the structural lines inherent in the
Constitution." Scott Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels- The New Judicial Activism in
Theory and Practice, 83 Marq. L. Rev. 435, 494-95 (1999). He argues that this
activism in the service of federalism has been "substantively neutral" as evidenced by
the fact that "courts using this philosophy have struck down both liberal and
conservative statutes, on subjects ranging from laws relating to violence against
women and the environment to laws protecting religion." Id. Fruehwald would
therefore describe the current Rehnquist Court as activist, federalist, and non-
ideological.
28Professor Alexander M. Bickel offered a very strong version of a restrained
federalist perspective. Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress 94 (1978). He was a vocal critic of the activism of the Warren Court, arguing
that the Court could not continue to earn respect if it repeatedly invalidated state
action. He stated:
The Court's effectiveness, it is often remarked, depends substantially on
confidence, on what is called prestige. It is likely, therefore-the proposition
has never previously had a real empirical test, but the Warren Court may have
provided one-that there is a natural quantitative limit to the number of major,
principled interventions the Court can permit itself per decade, let us say. It is a
matter of credibility. Will anyone who is not in a revolutionary state of
wholesale disillusionment with the society continue to believe that basic
principle is in question if the Court puts it in question every other Monday?
And will anyone whose frame of mind is one of total disillusionment with the
system be long content to take his principles from the Court? Revolutionaries
are not a reliable constituency for judges.
Id.
2 Herbert Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543,
558-60 (1954). He notes that legal scholarship has emphasized the importance of legal
processes to enforce the distribution of authority between the nation and the states.
Id. at 543-44. Professor Wechsler argues, however, that "the existence of the states as
governmental entities and as the sources of the standing law is in itself the prime
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sion of federalism, the Court would not play a large role in safe-
guarding any aspect of federalism. The Court's opinion in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit AuthorityeL best reflects the role
for courts envisioned by Professors Bickel and Wechsler. In Gar-
cia, the Court stated that "the principal means chosen by the
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in
the structure of the Federal Government itself."31 The Court con-
cluded: "State sovereign interests, then, are more properly
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power. ' This holding is a classic combination of belief in judicial
restraint and the importance of federalism.
Professor John Yoo, by contrast, holds the second view: that the
courts should only be restrained in considering the validity of state
action but might be activist in considering the validity of federal ac-
tion.' He argues that the Bill of Rights can be best understood as
restraining only Congress.' States, however, have an important po-
litical role in preserving federalism and individual rights: "In
addition to creating individual rights, states also were to serve as
the primary defenders of those rights against a national govern-
ment that sought to exceed the boundaries of its powers."'35
Professor Yoo's perspective on judicial review of state action
determinant of our working federalism, coloring the nature and the scope of our
national legislative processes from their inception." Id. at 546. He also argues that
federalism is served through the selection and composition of the national authority:
"[I]he states are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion,
the special centers of political activity, the separate geographical determinants of
national as well as local politics." Id.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
31 Id. at 550.
32Id. at 552.
nIn 1998, Professor Yoo authored an article in which he tried to provide guidance
on "where the line between the two spheres of government ought to rest." John C.
Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 27, 28
(1998).
34"A reading of the Bill of Rights reveals that many of its guarantees [sic] are not
written as individual rights as such, but as restrictions on what the federal government
may do with its enumerated powers." Id. at 33. He goes on to argue: "Furthermore,
the Bill of Rights, to the extent that it protects rights rather than restricts powers,
recognizes rights that belong to those in the majority, rather than the minority, to the




would appear to be consistent with that of Professors Bickel and
Wechsler: the federal courts should have little role in guaranteeing
individual rights at the state level. That task should be left to the
states.
Professor Yoo sharply disagrees with the Court's decision in
Garcia, because he believes that the courts should have a strong
role in making sure that Congress does not exceed its authority at
the expense of the states.' Nonetheless, he argues that the courts
should not have a significant role in protecting individual rights
when the states have allegedly violated those rights.' 7 Therefore,
like Professors Wechsler and Bickel, he agrees that courts should
rarely invalidate state action, although he is comfortable with the
Supreme Court displaying an activist role when Congress oversteps
its authority.
To test these views empirically, we hypothesized that a federalist
might be particularly likely to reverse a lower court when that
court has invalidated state action. A federalist would consider re-
versal as a proper exercise of his or her "policing" function, making
sure that lower courts do not inappropriately intrude into the af-
fairs of state government. We therefore consider the judicial
posture of the case on review (that is, the type of lower court and
the decision of the lower court) in constructing our empirical
model. We hypothesized that a federalist might aggressively use
the Court's certiorari authority and his or her own voting authority
to hear and reverse cases from the lower courts in which the lower
courts invalidated state action.
None of these authors suggest directly that a federalist should
defer to the decisions of a state's highest court in reviewing state
action, but political scientists have made this argument.' We hy-
- See Yoo, supra note 1, at 1311-15.
See id. at 1396-97 (arguing that state legislatures play a more important role in
protecting individual rights than do the courts); see also Yoo, supra note 33 (arguing
that federalism is about keeping the state and national governments in their
respective spheres).
3s See Davis, supra note 2, at 774; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("In most cases, comity and respect for federalism
compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law. That practice
reflects our understanding that the decisions of state courts are definitive pronounce-
ments of the will of the States as sovereigns.").
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pothesized, therefore, that a federalist might be particularly likely
to validate state action when the state's highest court had con-
cluded that the state action was constitutional. In such a situation,
both the state's highest court and its legislative or executive branch
are in agreement about the validity of the state action under ques-
tion. Hence, we hypothesized that judicial restraint by the Supreme
Court might be particularly apparent when the state's highest court
and the state's executive branch or legislative branch agree about
the validity of state action.
In Part II, we will examine these hypotheses by determining
whether the federalists were particularly inclined to validate state
action and whether their validation rate increased when the lower
court was a state court that had validated the state action.
B. Respect for Policies That Are Important to the States
A Justice's overall record of invalidating state action can provide
us with a general measure of that Justice's activism with respect to
matters involving state sovereignty. We also thought it would be
helpful to develop a measure that expresses whether the states
consider the particular issue to be important to' state sovereignty.
Not all matters involving state action are of equal importance to
the states.
We use the presence of amicus briefs as a measure of how
strongly states feel about an issue before the Court. There are
three ways that amicus briefs might reflect the importance of an is-
sue to state sovereignty. First, states can file or join an amicus brief
indicating their support for the state action under review. Second,
states can file or join an amicus brief indicating their opposition to
the state action under review. Third, nonprofit organizations that
purport to represent the states' interests can file an amicus brief in
support of the state action under review.
With respect to the first method of indicating support for the
state action under review, we did not expect to find a linear rela-
tionship between the number of states filing or joining briefs and
votes by federalists. We hypothesized that federalists would be
unlikely to be influenced by those briefs if ten or fewer states
joined those briefs. The inability of the authors of these amici
briefs to get the support of more than ten states might indicate that
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the silent states do not consider the issue to be important to state
sovereignty. As the "piling on" of amicus briefs has proliferated in
recent years, we did not expect that briefs filed by a small number
of states would have a positive outcome on the federalist Justices.
If anything, we hypothesized that this indication of low support
might have a negative impact on the outcome. Hence, we coded
the number of states joining these briefs into separate categories:
no states submitting a brief; one state submitting a brief, two to ten
states signing a brief; eleven to twenty-nine states signing a brief;
and thirty or more states signing a brief. These separate categories
permitted us to evaluate whether the presence of only a few signa-
tories for amicus briefs has the opposite impact of the presence of a
high number of signatories.
When some states file briefs opposing the state action under re-
view, we hypothesized that this conduct would be a signal to the
federalists that the issue is not at the core of state sovereignty. In
such instances, the federalists might be more inclined to invalidate
state action.
Finally, to test the third hypothesis, we coded the presence of briefs
by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Gover-
nor's Association, and the Council of State Governments 9 We
hypothesized that the presence of their briefs would correlate with a
lower state action invalidation rate for the federalist Justices because
their briefs would be a signal that the issue was important to state sov-
ereignty.
C. Protection of Separation of Powers
Although federalists generally endorse a restrained role for the
Court in considering matters of state sovereignty, we will also show
that they recognize that the Supremacy Clause leaves certain pow-
ers in the hands of the federal government. Protection of
separation of powers principles might therefore cause federalists to
3 Although we had originally intended to consider each of these organizations
separately for the purpose of quantitative analysis, we ultimately combined them
because they usually acted consistently. When one of these organizations filed an
amicus brief, usually at least one other organization did so as well. Of the fifty-seven
cases in which these organizations filed amicus briefs, there were only nine instances
in which only one of them filed an amicus brief.
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deviate from their underlying commitment to judicial restraint, in
some instances, by invalidating state action.
Professor James Thayer's article, "The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,"' is useful in helping to
understand the Court's proper role in safeguarding separation of
powers principles. Professor Thayer's article was written before the
courts had begun significant enforcement of the Civil War
Amendments to the Constitution, so he does not consider what
posture judges should take in reviewing state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment. He offers a classic restrained approach to
the role of a judge-that a court should be reluctant to invalidate
an action taken by another branch of government.41
Although Professor Thayer has a generally restrained perspec-
tive on judicial invalidation of legislative action, he accepts the
possibility that invalidation may sometimes be more appropriate
for state rather than federal action when separation of powers is-
sues are present in a case, because of the importance of the
Supremacy Clause.' Based on these writings, we might expect a
4 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
41 Id. at 148-49. He states:
The judicial function is merely that of fixing the outside border of reasonable
legislative action, the boundary beyond which the taxing power, the power of
eminent domain, police power, and legislative power in general, cannot go




If a State legislature passes a law which is impeached in the due course of
litigation before the national courts, as being in conflict with the supreme law of
the land, those courts may have to ask themselves a question different from that
which would be applicable if the enactments were those of a co-ordinate
department[. W]hen the question is whether State action be or be not
comformable to the paramount constitution, the supreme law of the land, we
have a different matter in hand. Fundamentally, it involves the allotment of
power between the two governments,-where the line is to be drawn. True, the
judiciary is still debating whether a legislature has transgressed its limit; but the
departments are not co-ordinate, and the limit is at a different point. The
judiciary now speaks as representing a paramount constitution and government,
whose duty it is, in all its departments, to allow to that constitution nothing less
than its just and true interpretation; and having fixed this, to guard it against
any inroads from without.
Id. at 154-55.
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federalist judge to be more willing to invalidate state action when a
case involves an issue of preemption than when it involves other
issues. Hence, we will consider whether the preemption issue is a
significant factor predicting invalidation of state action in our mul-
tivariate analysis in Section II.B.
D. Protecting Voting Rights
Professor John Yoo has also suggested that federalists might de-
viate from their generally restrained perspective by accepting
certiorari on cases like Bush v. Gore43 that involve contentious vot-
ing rights issues. Following the decision in Bush v. Gore, Professor
Yoo defended the Court's involvement in that case by arguing:
A principled adherence to federalism, however, does not re-
quire the Court to refuse to review the presidential election
procedures used by the states. Federalism does not create a
free-fire zone where states may do anything they please.
This is nowhere truer than in the area of voting.
... [T]he state's power over the manner of the selection of
presidential electors cannot go far beyond procedural matters
such as when and where an election is to be held. Once a state
began to use procedures, as in Florida, that may have advan-
taged one candidate over another, federalism principles
justified judicial preservation of the integrity of the electoral
process.'
,'531 U.S. 98 (2000).
"Yoo, supra note 12, at 784-86 (2001). Professor Yoo's argument does not apply
merely to Presidential elections. He argues that the Court has a legitimate role in
overseeing all state elections despite principles of federalism that provide some state
autonomy with respect to voting rights matters. He says:
Nonetheless, our constitutional system today permits substantial federal
intervention into state elections. Congress, for example, has required states to
use single-member districts for congressional elections since 1842. The
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution guarantee the
1318 [Vol. 88:1301
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The fact that the Court chose to get involved in the Florida elec-
tion process, of course, did not dictate the Court's ultimate holding.
The Court still had to decide whether to validate or invalidate the
state's action. Here, we found Professor Yoo's perspective to be
ambiguous. On the one hand, we believe that his general thesis
supports an activist, rather than a restrained, role for a Justice
when the Court accepts certiorari in a state election case. He sug-
gests, for example, that "[o]nce a state began to use procedures, as
in Florida, that may have advantaged one candidate over another,
federal principles justified judicial preservation of the integrity of
the electoral process."'45 His use of the term "judicial preservation"
would seem to support the use of the judicial power to invalidate
state action.
On the other hand, Professor Yoo does argue that, in Bush v.
Gore, the Court correctly validated the state's executive action by
reversing the Florida Supreme Court. This result was appropriate,
according to Professor Yoo, because Bush v. Gore happened to in-
volve a situation in which the judicial branch rather than the
executive branch was advantaging one candidate over another. 6
Thus, judicial intervention was appropriate to validate state ac-
tion. 7
At a minimum, therefore, it appears that Professor Yoo believes
that federalists should act differently in cases involving voting
rights. In addition, we hypothesized, based on his thesis, that a fed-
eralist would be inclined to invalidate state legislative or executive
action to preserve the integrity of the election process. We made
this hypothesis because, as a factual matter, the Court is more
individual right of each citizen to vote on an equal basis and prohibit states
from attempting to discriminate against protected groups by denying them
access to the voting booth. Bush v. Gore's per curiam holding found that the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal treatment in voting applied notjust to access to the ballot box, but also to a state's treatment of a vote after it is
cast.
Id. at 784 (internal citations omitted).
45 Id. at 786.
41 Of course, others might conclude that it was the executive branch rather than the
judicial branch in the Florida Presidential election that was violating the integrity of
the election process, making Bush v. Gore a typical rather than unusual election case.
47Professor Yoo appears to reject the argument "that national intervention into
state electoral systems violates the basic structure of our federal system of
government." Yoo, supra note 12, at 785.
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likely to hear cases in which the legislative or executive branch,
rather than the judicial branch, arguably acted inappropriately dur-
ing the election process.
As a result, we included a "voting rights issue" variable in our
multivariate analysis to determine whether Professor Yoo's de-
scription of federalism accurately describes the voting patterns of
any members of the Court. Are federalists more likely to invalidate
state action when a case involves a voting rights issue?" We will re-
port those results in Section H.B.
E. Ideology
None of the classical federalist authors described above support
an ideological role for the Court. Critical legal theorists, however,
argue that judges decide cases principally on ideological grounds.!9
Although few mainstream legal theorists urge judges to decide
cases on ideological grounds,50 Professor Ronald Dworkin is the
theorist most associated with an ideological perspective."
41 Of course, if our hypothesis is incorrect (in terms of the direction of influence)
then we would be able to learn that fact when we analyze our results. As we will
discuss, infra Section II.B, we found that Justice Kennedy is inclined to invalidate
state action in cases involving voting rights issues. Thus, it appears that we did pick a
plausible hypothesis for one federalist.
4, See generally The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (Daxid Kairys ed.,
1982) (suggesting that the idealized model of judicial decisionmaking hides a value-
laden system of law).
50 Judge Richard Posner is willing to accept the possibility that legal decisions may
have to be defended on pragmatic, political grounds rather than on neutral principles.
See Richard A. Posner, Interpretation Revisited, in Contemporary Perspectives on
Constitutional Interpretation 101, 114-15 (Susan J. Brison & Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong eds., 1993) (offering a pragmatic defense of the Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1995)). Professor Michael Perry has also
defended the judge's proper role in constitutional adjudication as involving "both law
and politics." Michael J. Perry, The Constitution in the Courts 204 (1994). By
contrast, Professor Robert Bork offered a strong articulation of the need for judges to
render decisions on "neutral" rather than ideological grounds when he argued:
The Madisonian dilemma is resolved in the way that the founders resolved it,
and the judge accepts the fact that he is bound by that resolution as law. He
need not, and must not, make unguided value judgments of his own.
This means, of course, that a judge, no matter on what court he sits, may
never create new constitutional rights or destroy old ones. Any time he does so,
he violates not only the limits to his own authority but, and for that reason, also
violates the rights of the legislature and the people.
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Nonetheless, a dominant view among political scientists is that
judicial behavior by the Supreme Court in constitutional cases can
be most readily explained on ideological or political grounds.' Pro-
fessors Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth call this model for
explaining voting behavior an "attitudinal model." This model con-
trasts with a "legal model," under which judges decide cases based
on "precedent, the plain meaning of the Constitution, the intent of
the framers, and a balancing of societal versus constitutional inter-
ests. ' Under this ideological perspective, precedent and other
neutral factors certainly play a role in a Justice's decisions, but ide-
ology is also understood to help predict judicial outcome. Political
scientists, in fact, have questioned whether the votes of Justices can
be accurately explained by notions of judicial restraint' or federal-
ism.' They contend that ideology is a superior explanation.'
Robert H. Bork, The Original Understanding, in Contemporary Perspectives on
Constitutional Interpretation, supra, at 48, 53. Similarly, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist has argued that it is dangerous for judges to interpret the Constitution on
the basis of "contemporary, fashionable notions of what a living Constitution should
contain." William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, in Taking the
Constitution Seriously 69, 73 (Gary L. McDowell ed., 1981). He concludes that it is
"genuinely corrosive of the fundamental values of our democratic society" if a judge
is able to act based on deeply felt value judgments. Id. at 78.
51 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, at ix (1986).
52If this Essay had been written primarily to a political science audience, our
primary hypothesis would have been that the Justices' votes could be most easily
predicted on an ideological basis. We would have then asked if any factors other than
ideology could also predict the judicial outcomes. We have chosen, however, to write
this Essay primarily to a legal audience that is accustomed to viewing the Court in
more ideologically neutral terms. Hence, our primary hypothesis is that the Justices'
voting behavior can be explained in federalism terms, but we also explore whether
ideology can also predict judicial behavior.
9 Segal & Spaeth, supra note 2, at 64-65.
m Professor Harold Spaeth wrote the seminal article in political science which
disputed that judicial restraint plays a dominant role in explaining voting behavior by
Supreme Court Justices. Spaeth, Judicial Restraint, supra note 2, at 22-23. He started
with one of our premises-that judicial restraint is a component of federalism. Id. at
23. Based on his data, Professor Spaeth concluded that judicial restraint did not play a
significant role in guiding judicial behavior during the Warren Court era:
In conclusion then, the answer to the question posed in the title to this paper
is that the judicial restraint of Justice Frankfurter, in the cases decided formally
during the first seven terms of the Warren Court which involve state or
administrative agency action regulatory of business or labor unions, is a myth.
Judicial restraint is thoroughly subordinated to the attitudes of the justices
toward business and labor. The concept serves only to cloak the political
character of the judicial process and thereby helps to preserve the traditional
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We coded whether the Court was asked to review a liberal or
conservative state action and coded the issue at stake in the case.
We defined the terms "liberal" and "conservative" according to the
ideological direction of the public policy. 7 We discuss these results
view that judges merely find and do not make law. Not only for Frankfurter, but
for all the Warren Court justices, the concept of judicial restraint is an effective
means of rationalizing response to policy-oriented values.
Id. at 38.
Our primary focus is the Rehnquist Court, not the Warren Court. Like Professor
Spaeth, we examine whether judicial restraint is an important component of the
voting behavior of the so-called "federalists." Unlike Professor Spaeth, however, we
will be examining cases involving state action rather than federal action.
55 Professor Sue Davis has examined Chief Justice Rehnquist's voting behavior
before he became Chief Justice, in cases in which the Court reviewed a decision of a
state's highest court. She compared those votes with cases that came to the Supreme
Court from the lower federal court. Based on that data, she concluded that federalism
is not an important predictor of Chief Justice Rehnquist's voting behavior. She stated:
Rehnquist's hierarchy of values should be redefined as folloN s. At the top:
conservative results. Federalism is important only when it coincides with such
results. Most notably, in the area of criminal procedure law and order ranks
well above federalism. Consequently, "Rehnquist's Judicial Philosophy" should
be discarded and replaced with "Rehnquist's Conservative Political Agenda."
Davis, supra note 2, at 781.
Our database examines Rehnquist's votes since he became Chief Justice. We also
operationalize federalism differently than Professor Davis. She hypothesizes, for
example, that a "federalist" Justice would affirm the highest state court when that
court overturns a criminal conviction because a federalist should be committed to the
principle of state autonomy and therefore would not want to displace the decision of
the state's highest court. Id. at 774. We hypothesized, by contrast, that a federalist
would be inclined to reverse lower court decisions-state or federal-that invalidated
state action, because a federalist would view himself or herself as performing an
important "policing" function to prevent the courts from interfering with state
legislative or executive policies. In addition, we hypothesized that a federalist might
be more deferential to lower state courts than lower federal courts but, ultimately, we
hypothesized that a federalist would be interested in protecting the sovereignty of
state legislative or executive action rather than state judicial action. For further
discussion of our hypotheses, see supra Part I.
See Anthony Champagne & Stuart S. Nagel, The Advocates of Restraint: Holmes,
Brandeis, Stone, and Frankfurter, in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint 303,315-
16 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982); Harold J. Spaeth & Stuart H.
Teger, Activism and Restraint: A Cloak for the Justices' Policy References, in
Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, supra, at 277,278.
"Although the term "conservative" often means "restrained," we are not using it in
that manner. See supra note 21. Instead, we use that term as it is used in the Supreme
Court Database described in note 8, supra. The codebook for the Supreme Court
Database says that it used "conventional" definitions of conservative and liberal; we
worked backward from the coding in the Supreme Court Database to discern what it
considered to be "conventional." Id. at 54. Conservatism, as used ir the Supreme
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in bivariate form in Section ILA and examine them more closely in
Section I.B as part of our multivariate analysis. Although we
quantitatively examined interaction terms between, for example,
whether the state action was liberal and whether the issue involved
in the case involved free speech, we did not find those results use-
ful because of limitations with the coding system.' We examine
such interactions through qualitative analysis in Part III.
Court Database, can be viewed as supporting economic liberty (for example, freedom
of contract) and opposing personal liberty (for example, expression, abortion rights).
Id. at 55-56. Liberalism is defined as limiting economic liberty and enhancing
personal liberty. Id. For example, a liberal state action would be one that enhances
the rights of those accused of crimes, expands abortion rights, favors affirmative
action policies, supports union rights, and generally favors the underprivileged.
Conservative state action would improve the relative standing of business vis-A-vis
consumers, restrict the rights of criminal defendants, and oppose increased environ-
mental protection.
We were able to confirm that the Supreme Court Database did use the term
"conservative" as understood in contemporary American politics. Though traditional
views of conservatism may suggest opposition to economic liberty-see Andrew
Vincent, Modem Political Ideologies 79 (2d ed. 1995)-the New Right and the
American heirs of the conservative tradition, the Republican party, can certainly be
characterized as supportive of economic freedom in terms of fewer government
regulations, lower taxes, and weaker unions. See id. at 79--80; Republican Platform
2000, http:llwww.mc.orglgopinfo/platform (last visited Aug. 30, 2002). Accordingly,
we used the Supreme Court Database's variable for ideological direction ("DIR") of
Court outcome variable to code the ideology of the underlying state action. The state
action is coded as conservative if the Supreme Court decision validated state action
and was conservative or the state action was invalidated and the decision was liberal.
We coded the state action as liberal if the Court validated the state action and the
Court decision was liberal or if the Court invalidated the state action and its decision
was conservative.
$8 We defined the issue categories broadly in order to have sufficient numbers of
cases in each category. That breadth, however, did distort some of the categories. As
we discuss in Part III, the free speech and religion categories did not work well as
single categories because of the multitude of sub-issues within each of those
categories. The free speech category included both free speech and freedom of
association cases. The religion category included both free exercise and establishment
clause cases. A Justice might not vote consistently on these subcategory of cases. We




A. Federalism: Bivariate Analysis
In order to distinguish the possible factors that contribute to each of
the Justice's decisions when deciding whether to invalidate state action
on federal constitutional law grounds, we collected data on all of the
cases in which each Justice participated since Justice Rehnquist became
Chief Justice. The collected cases ran from the beginning of the 1986
Term to the end of the 2000 Term. Using the Justice's vote as the de-
pendent variable, we collected data on the features of the case,
including lower court treatment of the case, the issue area of the state
action, participation by amici curiae, and the ideological direction of the
underlying state action 9
1. Restraint
We hypothesized that federalist Justices believe in judicial re-
straint and should therefore invalidate state action less frequently
than their colleagues. We tested this hypothesis through bivariate
analysis. Table 1 reports the absolute rates of invalidation of state
action for Justices who decided more than 150 cases where a state
action was at issue since Rehnquist became Chief Justice.
TABLE 1: INVALIDATION RATES UNDER CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST
JUSTICE i INVALIDATION RATE PERCENTAGE
Blackmun 191 of 293 65.2
Brennan 142 of 183 77.6
Kennedy 167 of 346 48.3
Marshall 171 of 214 79.9
O'Connor 183 of 414 44.2
Rehnquist 127 of 415 30.6
Scalia 152 of 416 36.5
Souter 135 of 230 58.7
Stevens 284 of 416 68.3
Thomas 85 of 198 42.9
White Ill of 274 40.5
Our complete results for each Justice are reported in the Appendix.
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The Justices most frequently considered to have a restrained
perspective are, indeed, the least likely to invalidate state action.
Justice Scalia, for example, has an invalidation rate of 36.5%, while
Justices more typically associated with activism have much higher
invalidation rates. For example, during their tenure on the
Rehnquist Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to invali-
date more than three-quarters of the state actions subject to
constitutional challenge in this time period.
This bivariate finding, however, does not support a restrained
federalist perspective upon closer examination because we do not
consider invalidation rates ranging from 30.6% to 48.3% for the
federalists to be low in absolute terms. In absolute terms, we con-
sider a "low" invalidation rate to be under 25% and a high
invalidation rate to be over 75%. Under this quartile approach,
Justices Brennan and Marshall would have high invalidation rates
while the rest of the Justices would be in the moderate category.
In evaluating the absolute values involved, it is helpful to re-
member that the Court has considerable control over its docket
and therefore tends to accept certiorari on cases in which it desires
to reverse the lower court. As a matter of efficiency, it makes sense
for the Court to hear cases to correct the errors of the lower court.
But there is no reason that correcting those errors should cause the
Court to have a high rate of invalidating state action. If anything,
the influence should go in the opposite direction. A federalist
might be particularly alarmed when a lower court improperly in-
validates state action, thereby treading on the state's sovereignty.
In searching for cases upon which to grant certiorari, a federalist
might particularly want to grant certiorari in cases in which the
lower court improperly invalidated state action, thereby giving the
Supreme Court a high state validation rate. The selection bias
problem, if anything, should therefore depress rather than raise the
invalidation rate of the federalists.
Nonetheless, we do not want to overstate our observation that
the federalists have a modest rather than a low invalidation rate.
As a whole, the federalists have a lower invalidation rate than the
nonfederalists, so it does appear that judicial restraint, as a com-
parative matter, is a feature of their judicial philosophy. In other
words, the federalists appear to be somewhat more restrained than
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the nonfederalists. Through bivariate and multivariate analysis, we
try to understand why this difference is not even more dramatic.
What factors are causing the invalidation rate for the federalists to
rise above the 25% mark? Does federalism itself act as a buffer on
restraint, or does that influence come from outside of federalism?
2. Ideology
Our bivariate invalidation statistics suggest that some factor
other than a hesitancy to invalidate state action may explain the in-
validation rate for the federalists. Because political scientists
believe that ideology is a significant predictor of judicial behavior,
we inquired whether the federalists' ideological activism might be
causing a low invalidation rate for cases involving state action. Al-
though we explore this hypothesis in more depth in Section I.B,
we can see preliminarily through bivariate analysis that ideology
appears to be a significant factor in raising the invalidation rate of
the federalists from the low to the moderate level.
Table 2 reports invalidation rates in relationship to the ideology
of the underlying state action.
TABLE 2: INVALIDATION RATE AND IDEOLOGY OF STATE ACTION
INVALIDATION INVALIDATION RATE
JUSTCE RATE OF LIBERAL OF CONSERVATIVE DIFFERENCE
STATE ACTION STATE ACTION
Blackmun 24 of 64 (37.5%) 167 of 229 (72.9%) -35.4 %
Brennan 15 of 37 (40.5%) 127 of 146 (87.0%) -46.5%
Kennedy 43 of 80 (53.8%) 124 of 266 (46.6%) 7.2%
Marshall 16 of 39 (41.0%) 155 of 175 (88.6%) -47.6%
O'Connor 50 of 93 (53.8%) 133 of 321 (41.4%) 12.4%
Rehnquist 41 of 95 (432%) 86 of 320 (26.9%) 16.3%
Scalia 53 of 95 (55.8%) 99 of 321 (30.8%) 25.0%
Souter 24 of 56 (42.9%) 111 of 174 (63.8%) -20.9%
Stevens 41 of 94 (43.6%) 243 of 322 (75.5%) -31.9%
Thomas 39 of 55 (70.9%) 46 of 143 (32.2%) 38.7%
White 24 of 56 (42.9%) 87 of 218 (39.9%) 3.0%
As Table 2 reflects, there appears to be a strong relationship be-
tween the likelihood of invalidating state action and political
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ideology for most of the federalists and nonfederalists. The Justices
who deviate somewhat from this pattern are Justices White, Ken-
nedy, and O'Connor. Justice White, in particular, appears to defy
ideological characterization. His invalidation rate is only modestly
higher when the state action was liberal rather than conservative.
The figures for Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are also consistent
with the common perception that they are the "swing" voters on
the Court. They are much more likely to invalidate conservative
state action than the other federalists. The most ideological mem-
bers of the Rehnquist Court appear to be Justices Brennan, a
liberal, and Thomas, a conservative, because they have the highest
values in the difference column.
These results suggest that a factor other than a hesitancy to in-
validate state action predicts the voting behavior of the federalists
on the Rehnquist Court. To the extent that voting pursuant to a
conservative ideology causes federalists to invalidate state action,
that ideological tendency may curb a Justice's overall federalist
tendency to be restrained and validate state action. These results
might even make us inquire whether federalism plays any role in
predicting the voting behavior of the federalists in cases involving
the validity of state action. As we discuss below, however, we do
find some evidence that federalism plays a role in predicting the
voting behavior of the federalists in state action cases.
B. Federalism: Multivariate Analysis
We conducted a multivariate regression analysis to determine
the ability of our bivariate findings to withstand controls for other
factors, including lower court disposition, presence of amicus
briefs, different issue areas, and the ideology of the state action.6
wWe used probit, a maximum likelihood estimator, because the dependent variable was
dichotomous and Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS") regression would produce biased results.
J. Scott Long, Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables 38
(1997). Maximum likelihood estimates can only be reliable when there are a large number of
cases, so we excluded Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, neither of whom have enough votes to
sustain our analysis. As we present the analyses below, we report the predicted probability of
an invalidation vote for each Justice because interpretation of probit coefficients on their
own is not as straightforward as for OLS coefficients. Multivariate regression allows us to
subject our expectations about federalist behavior to a test that also allows us to look at the
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By controlling for the influence of other factors, we are able to
make a stronger claim about the relationship between a given in-
dependent variable and the Justice's vote. This is necessary
because we have competing expectations for what behavior might
best represent federalism. Therefore, we need to control for some
factors to understand the true causal relationship between vari-
ables of interest and the Justice's vote to validate or invalidate
state action.
We report our results through a predicted probabilities analy-
sis.' The value of each cell in the tables that follow is the predicted
probability that a given Justice will vote to invalidate a state action,
given a certain set of characteristics that form our "baseline" re-
sults.'2 The choice of this baseline is arbitrary, and we could alter it
without changing any of the coefficient estimates or the predicted
probabilities of invalidation. If a given factor makes a Justice sig-
nificantly more or less likely than the baseline to invalidate a state
action, we place that predicted probability in bold numbers and
note it with an asterisk.
As discussed in Part I, four criteria to measure the presence of
federalism in voting behavior emerge from the literature on feder-
alism: (1) whether a state or federal lower court validates the
underlying state action; (2) whether states or amicus organizations
file briefs in support of or in opposition to the underlying state ac-
tion; (3) whether a preemption or voting rights issue is present in
ideological orientation of the underlying state action. The Appendix reports the full
regression models for each Justice.61 Predicted probabilities allow us to demonstrate the change in likelihood of an event
(here, the probability that a Justice will vote to invalidate the state action) when we change
some of the characteristics of the hypothetical case that the justice is reviexing. In OLS, a
coefficient itself can be given substantive meaning. it is the unit change in Y expected with a
one-unit change in X. Such simple interpretation can not be given to a coefficient from
maximum likelihood estimation like probit Using predicted probabilities is a commonly
accepted method of interpreting coefficients like those calculated in our analysis. See Long,
supra note 60, at 64; Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving
Interpretation and Presentation, 44 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 348, 348 (2000). Using OLS regression
has the virtue of producing easily interpretable coefficients: an OLS coefficient-a partial
slope coefficient--can be understood as the change in Yresulting from a one-unit change in
Xwhen all else is held constant. Such a straightforward interpretation of probit coefficients is
not possible. Accordingly, we present our results as predicted probabilities.
12 See infra note 65 and accompanying text for a description of the characteristics
that form our baseline results. Table 3 summarizes these results.
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the case; and (4) whether the underlying state action is ideologi-
cally conservative. Additionally, we coded whether the Court
heard the case under its certiorari jurisdiction. Because the certio-
rari rules changed during the time period of our study, we needed
to control for that rule change.' Finally, we coded the presence of
the Solicitor General as amicus curiae because we hypothesized
that the Solicitor General's position would be given deference by
all members of the Court. ' Because it is a factor that might predict
judicial outcome, we had to include it in our equation even if we
did not believe that it would distinguish federalists from nonfeder-
alists.
In our model, the baseline has the following characteristics:
* the lower court is a federal court that validated the state ac-
tion;
* the underlying state action is conservative;
* no amicus briefs are filed;
* the issue in the case is procedural due process;
* the Solicitor General does not file an amicus brief; and
* the Court hears the case under its certiorari jurisdiction.
The baseline results, summarized in Table 3, are also reported in
the first column of Tables 4 through 8 below.
"The Court abandoned its mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 1988. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1994); David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision, reprinted in 28 U.S.CA. § 1257
(1993). Before 1988, the Court had to hear all cases from the lower federal courts where
those courts had invalidated state action or where state courts had validated state action on
federal constitutional grounds. Today, it can deny certiorari for those cases in which the
lower federal court properly invalidated state action, which has the effect of leaving the lower
court invalidation intact. Thus, one would expect the percentage of cases in which the Court
affimis a lower federal court invalidation to have declined since 1988 because the Court can
achieve the same result by denying certiorari.
Political scientists have found that the presence of the Solicitor General correlates with a
Supreme Court decision adopting the Solicitor General's position. See, e.g., Segal & Spaeth,
supra note 2, at 238 (1993) (reporting that the party supported by the Solicitor General won
87% of the time for the years 1943,1944,1963, and 1965). We thank Greg Caldeira and Corey
Ditslear for helping us locate data about the Solicitor General's amicus briefs. We used the
home page of the Office of the Solicitor General to locate the Solicitor General's anicus curiae
briefs. See Office of the Solicitor General, at http/www.usdoj.gov/osg (last visited Sep. 6,2002).
We used LEXIS-NEXIS to gather the information regarding a few missing cases.
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TABLE 3: BASELINE PROBABILITY OF INVALIDATING STATE ACTIONO













In Part I, we hypothesized that a federalist should display re-
straint by being hesitant to invalidate state action. As an absolute
matter, we have already reported in Section lI.A our results with
respect to the restrained voting pattern of the Justices.
We also generated two other hypotheses that we examine in this
Section: (1) that a federalist might be most inclined to reverse a
lower court decision when that decision results in the invalidity of
state action, and (2) that a federalist might be particularly inclined
6 Under our baseline model, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas,
Kennedy, and Scalia are the least likely to vote to invalidate state action, followed,
interestingly, by Justice Marshall. These results, however, are not meaningful standing
by themselves because they make important assumptions about the cases, such as that
the underlying state action is conservative. The key importance of these statistics is
that they give us a baseline upon which to make comparisons for further analysis. We
can see how these probabilities change when we change one factor in the equation. If
the variable is a statistically significant predictor of a Justice's vote to invalidate
(positive or negative), then the change in predicted probability can be considered real
and not merely a matter of chance. We typically use a conventional level of
significance, p< .05, in a two-tailed test, to determine how confident we are that the
observed influence of a given variable is real and not a matter of chance. This is
analogous to claiming that we are 95% confident that each of the variables that is
bold is a real predictor of a Justice's vote to invalidate state action. The baseline
figure is therefore not very important in itself, but it helps us understand the meaning
of the predicted probabilities results that follow.
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to affirm a lower court when that court is a state court that has
ruled that the underlying state action was constitutional.
Table 4 below helps us explore these hypotheses. Probabilities
that are significantly different from the baseline at p<.05 are in
bold type and are followed by an asterisk. In order to determine
whether the influence is to increase or decrease the likelihood of
invalidating state action, one can compare the result with the base-
lines results listed in the first column. For example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has a significant value of 0.108 for the column "Federal
Court Invalidated State Action." The baseline value is 0.455.
Hence, his value for "Federal Court Invalidated Stae Action" is
significantly lower from the baseline ("Federal Court Validated
State Action") and is therefore in bold type and followed by an as-
terisk. In other words, he has a 45.5% propensity to invalidate state
action when the lower federal court validated state action and only
a 10.8% propensity to invalidate state action when the lower fed-
eral court invalidated state action.
TABLE 4: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A VOTE
TO INVALIDATE STATE ACTION
EDERALCOURT FEDERALCOURT STATECOURT STATECOURT
JUSTICE VAIDATEDSTATE ACTON IuVAmDATED VALIDATED INVALIDATED
(BASENEPROBABILITY) STATE ACTION STATE ACTION STATEACON
Blakmun .738 .789 .775 .472*
Brennan .714 .807 .880 .453
Kennedy .430 .224* .449 .133*
Marshall .408 .729 .736 .488
O'Connor .796 .519* .626* .405*
Rehnquist .455 .108* .364 .169*
Scalia .470 .252* .442 .146"
Souter .842 .777 .877 .734
Stevens .683 .707 .684 .486*
Thomas .306 .046*" .367 .082*
White .508 .343 .629 .475
Our data support the first hypothesis for the federalists: As seen
in columns two and four, they are particularly likely to validate
state action by reversing the lower court when the lower court had
2002] 1331
1332 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 88:1301
invalidated state action. In other words, they understand it to be
important to their judicial role to "police" the lower courts and re-
verse their decisions when, in their opinion, the lower court has
incorrectly invalidated state action. Hence, the results in columns
two and four are significant for the federalists and are therefore
lower than the results in column one.'
Justice O'Connor fits the general picture we found for the other
federalists with respect to columns one, two, and four. But Justice
O'Connor's voting behavior also fits the second hypothesis-that a
federalist might particularly defer to the decision of a lower state
court. This conclusion can be drawn by comparing column three
with column one. When the lower court validates state action, she
is less likely to reverse state courts than federal courts (.626 corn-
0 These findings are also consistent with a notion of the Justices as strategic policy seekers.
See generally Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make, at xiii (1998) (arguing
that the Justices' votes are the product of strategic decisionmaking, not just a result of
ideology or of a stance on judicial activism or restraint). A strategically minded, policy-driven
Justice would engage in aggressive grants of certiorari on cases she can -*in and defensive
denials of cases she thought she would lose at the merits stage. See Gregory A. Caldeira et
al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L Econ. & Org. 549,
570-71 (1999). Since Justice Thomas joined the Court, the five Justices we study here have
had a clear majority of the Court, allowing those Justices to control the cases the Court hears.
If the Justices in control of the certiorari decision take cases they want to reverse, then our
findings also provide support of strategic behavior by the Justices in pursuit of policy goals, as
they are generally more likely to vote to invalidate when the lower court validated and vice
versa.
Political scientists have also found that the Justices are more likely to grant review if
a conflict exists between the circuits on an issue. But such a finding is not inconsistent
with arguing that the Justices who control the merits outcomes grant review in cases
they seek to reverse. The Court may be able to choose which case to review when a
conflict exists, and it often grants certiorari to hear the case which it is inclined to
reverse. Compare Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995), with Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,
202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 923 (2000), rev'd. 533 U.S. 98
(2001). Nonetheless, on the whole, the affirmance rate is higher for cases taken to
resolve conflicts (44%) than for all cases (23.5%). (These numbers are derived from
the Michigan State Supreme Court Database, see supra note 8; they include all cases
decided between 1953 and the end of the 2000 Term.) The number of cases taken to
resolve circuit splits is quite low, 14.5% of the cases decided between 1953 and 2001.
If circuit splits reduce the incidence of votes to reverse lower court decisions, the
findings reported in Table 4 would be even less likely to occur. That there is evidence
of the five Justices taking cases to reverse lower court decisions despite this higher
affirmance rate for cases taken to resolve lower court disagreements suggests that
their behavior is even more pronounced in cases where court conflict is not an issue.
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pared to .796). This suggests that she is less likely to invalidate
state action when a lower state court agrees with either the state
executive or legislature than when a lower federal court agrees
with either the state executive or legislature. In other words, like
the other federalists, Justice O'Connor is significantly likely to play
a "policing" role in which she is likely to reverse lower courts when
they invalidate state action. But she is also sensitive to whether the
lower court is a state or a federal court. She is not likely to disagree
with the policy decisions of state judicial and executive actors when
those actors are in agreement with each other.67
In all, then, we found moderate invalidation rates for each of the
federalist Justices that were somewhat lower than the invalidation
rates for the nonfederalists. The rates, however, were not low in an
absolute sense. We found a tendency by the federalists to intervene
to reverse lower court decisions that had invalidated state action.
We also found that Justice O'Connor differed from the other fed-
eralists in that she was sensitive to whether the lower court was
state or federal.
2. Respect for Policies That Are Important to the States
We expected that the federalists would show respect both for
amicus curiae briefs filed by states in support of other states and
amicus briefs filed by the nonprofit organizations that lobby on be-
half of the states." We identified three methods for measuring a
67 Justice O'Connor is the only member of the Rehnquist Court to have served in
both the state legislature and the state judiciary. It is possible that her experience in
these institutions caused her to be particularly respectful of those institutions when
they are in agreement with each other. This hypothesis is contrary to the views
expressed by Professor Jeffrey Rosen in his article, "A Majority of One," N.Y. Times,
June 3,2001, § 6, at 32. He observes that:
O'Connor's experience as a state legislator seems to have given her a robust
skepticism about the state and federal legislative process. "Somebody was
making the case about a state legislature, and the gist of her comment was, 'I
was in a state legislature-I know how foolishly they can act,"' a former clerk
remembers. "Having been there, she understands that these were not such wise
deliberative bodies."
Id.
69 In some categories of this (and other variables), we encountered a problem of
perfect prediction. In these cases, a Justice voted to invalidate state action in all of the
cases in a certain category of the variable. In Table 5, we found that every time states
2002] 1333
Virginia Law Review
concern for state sovereignty as reflected by deference to views ex-
pressed in these amicus briefs. First, we hypothesized that a
federalist might be inclined to invalidate state action when only a
few states support the state action in question by filing amicus
briefs but that a federalist would be inclined to validate state action
when many states support state action. Hence, to see if votes to in-
validate changed as the number of states changed, we created
separate categories that varied according to the number of states
supporting state action.' Second, we hypothesized that a federalist
might be inclined to invalidate state action if some states actually
opposed the state action. States rarely write amicus briefs urging
the Court to invalidate state action, however, so we were not opti-
mistic that this variable would be helpful. Third, we hypothesized
that a federalist might be inclined to vote to validate state action
when amicus organizations that purport to represent the states
urge them to do so. We coded for the presence of amicus briefs by
the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Gov-
ernors Association, or the Council of State Governments for this
purpose.
Finally, as noted previously, we coded for the presence of the
Solicitor General as amicus curiae. We coded whether the Solicitor
General supported state action and whether the Solicitor General
opposed state action. We hypothesized that the Solicitor General's
position would correlate with the voting record of all members of
the Court and would not vary on the basis of the federalism label.
Table 5 reports our results for our primary three hypotheses.
filed a brief opposing the state action under review, Justices Brennan. Marshall, and
Souter voted to invalidate that action. That means that the variable gives us no
leverage on predicting votes to invalidate and had to be excluded from the analysis.
This happens with some of the issue categories reported in Table 7, and with some of
the interactions we used to calculate the multivariate models. See infra note 73. We
discuss the problems with the interaction terms in more detail in the Appendix.
19 We looked at the invalidation rate of the Justices based on five categories of state
participation: no states submitting an amicus brief, only one state submitting an
amicus brief, only a few states (2-10) submitting an amicus brief, several states (11-
29) submitting an amicus brief, and a substantial majority of states (30 or more)
submitting an amicus brief.
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The data do not support our first hypothesis-that the filing of
amicus briefs by states would only influence the federalists when a
significant number of states joined briefs in support of the state ac-
tion. In fact, the only significant effect on federalists is in the
opposite direction from what we predicted. Justice Scalia is signifi-
cantly more likely to invalidate state action if more than thirty
states filed an amicus brief in support of the state action. In the
cases where thirty or more states "pile on" amicus briefs, therefore,
Justice Scalia is more likely to invalidate state action.
We closely examined the group of cases in which more than
thirty states signed amicus briefs to see if there is anything signifi-
cant about these cases that might explain these results. We found
that twelve out of eighteen of these cases involved review of crimi-
nal law issues. It may be that the federalism label is not a good
predictor of votes on cases involving criminal law issues for Justice
Scalia."
Our data also do not support our second hypothesis-that the
federalists would be inclined to invalidate state action when some
states filed briefs opposing the state action. That fact is a perfect
predictor for Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Souter: They always
voted to invalidate state action when states filed briefs opposing
the state action.
Our inability to find statistical significance for the federalist Jus-
tices may be explained by the small number of cases in the
database fitting this description, as well as the ideological inclina-
tion of these cases. There were only eleven cases in our study in
which some states filed briefs opposing the state action. In nine of
these cases, the underlying state action was coded as conservative.
More importantly, many of those cases involved very controversial
political issues, such as gay rights, abortion, and single-sex educa-
tion, on which we would expect the Justices to have strong
Others have described Justice Scalia's pattern of decisions as reflecting a strong
sense of judicial independence. For example, Professor Gottlieb argues that Justice
Scalia is "Darwinian" in his outlook, although Justice Scalia himself has rejected that
position. See Antonin Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism and the Legal Order, 9 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 123, 124 (1986). In his article, however, Scalia does not purport to
describe how he decides cases; he, instead, is suggesting how one might determine
public policy. Id.
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ideological preferences and, therefore, on which they would not
easily be persuaded by amicus briefs. Our finding that most of the
Justices vote on an ideological basis may explain the results in
these eleven cases. We discuss this further in Section III.B.
Finally, our data provide only limited support for our third hy-
pothesis: that federalists would be particularly influenced by the
views expressed by nonprofit organizations." The presence of
amicus briefs by nonprofit organizations does appear to have an in-
fluence on Justices Blackmun and White-neither of whom would
be typically considered to be federalists. In addition, it does appear
to have an effect on Justice Kennedy. Each of these Justices is sig-
nificantly more likely to vote to validate state action if nonprofit
organizations supported the state action.
We cannot explain the results for Justice Kennedy on ideological
grounds. Of the fifty-six cases in the database in which the non-
profit organizations filed amicus briefs, twenty-nine involved
review of liberal state action, and twenty-six involved review of
conservative state action. The liberal state action cases, however,
did not involve "hot button" liberal issues; rather, they tended to
involve issues like preemption or commercial law. There are no
cases involving liberal state action on the equal protection issue.
Similarly, the conservative state action cases did not involve
"hot button" conservative issues. Many of the conservative
state action cases involved free speech issues upon which some
commentators have suggested that the liberal/conservative dis-
tinction does not work well.' Hence, it may be true that the
cases in which the nonprofit organizations file briefs are the mod-
erate cases in which Justice Kennedy is open to persuasion.
Alternatively, nonprofit organizations may tend to file briefs in
cases in which Justice Kennedy is already inclined to validate state
action. His federalism may be consistent with that of the nonprofit
organizations.
1 This was a dichotomous variable-whether the nonprofit organizations did or did
not file an amicus brief. The variable was positive when at least one of the nonprofit
organizations filed an amicus brief.
"2See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 7 (arguing that the conservative label does not fit
Justice Kennedy's decisions under the Free Speech and Religion Clauses).
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As a whole, we see little evidence that the federalists are influ-
enced for or against invalidation of state action by amicus briefs
filed either by the states themselves or by nonprofit organizations.
One reason that the federalists might not have been influenced by
amicus briefs may be that the amici only wrote briefs on close cases
that they thought required extra advocacy. It is hard to control for
this form of strategic behavior but we see no evidence in support of
that hypothesis from the data we have available. Of the 112 cases
that were decided by a 5-4 vote, the nonprofit amicus organizations
only filed briefs in nine instances (8.0%). By contrast, they filed
briefs in fifty-one of the 305 cases (16.7%) which were not decided
by a 5-4 vote. Of course, the vote of the Court is not a predictive
factor that they could consider ex ante in deciding whether to file
an amicus brief. And one might even argue that the filing of the
amicus briefs helped ensure that the fifty-one cases would not to be
decided by a close margin. But if we assume that the decision to
file an amicus brief is an expression of the importance of a case
rather than a prediction that the vote will be close, it appears that
the presence of these briefs does not correlate with a pro-state ac-
tion outcome in our database.
Finally, the federalists may not be particularly influenced by
states filing briefs on behalf of each other because that practice has
become so commonplace as to be rendered meaningless. In our
study, states filed amicus briefs in support of each other in 151 of
417 (36.5%) cases. The practice of filing an amicus brief may not be
noteworthy unless a large number of states sign briefs and, even
then, only the nonfederalists may be open to persuasion on those
cases. Our data would therefore suggest that authors of amicus
briefs on state action issues should have the nonfederalists rather
than the federalists in mind as their target audience, because the
federalists do not appear to be persuaded by their efforts.
As discussed above, we also coded for the presence of the Solici-
tor General and considered whether the Solicitor General
supported or opposed the state action. Table 6 reports our findings
with respect to that variable.
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TABLE 6: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES BY PRESENCE OF
AMIcUS BRIEF BY SOLICITOR GENERAL
NO AMICUS BY SOLICITOR SOLICITOR
SOLICITOR GENERAL GENERALAAICUS-
JUSTICE GENERAL AMICUS- INVALIDATE
(BASELINE) VALIDATE
Blackmun .738 .485* .630
Brennan .714 .479* .201*
Kennedy .430 .277* .783*
Marshall .408 .309 112*
O'Connor .796 Z574* .853
Rehnquist .455 .308 .535
Scalia .470 .326* .627
Souter .842 .625* .940
Stevens .683 .504* .652
Thomas .306 .367 .693*
White .580 .363* .813
As we hypothesized, this is a factor that seemingly influences
both federalists and nonfederalists. There is a significantly increased
likelihood that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Bren-
nan, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and White will
validate state action when the Solicitor General supports state action.
Fewer Justices are influenced by the Solicitor General urging invalida-
tion of state action, however. There is a significantly increased
likelihood that Justices Kennedy and Thomas will invalidate state
action when the Solicitor General opposes state action and that
Justices Brennan and Marshall will validate state action when the
Solicitor General opposes state action. Given the time period un-
der question for Justices Brennan and Marshall, it may be that they
resisted the requests of Republican Solicitors General.
These data are contrary to our initial hypothesis because the So-
licitor General urging invalidation predominantly affects
federalists. Consistent with our hypothesis, both federalists and
nonfederalists are influenced by the Solicitor General urging vali-
dation of state action, and, consistent with our hypothesis, nearly
all the federalists have at least a trend toward significance on that
variable.
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We examined the invalidation data more closely to understand
why federalists were influenced more strongly when the Solicitor
General urged invalidation of state action. There are thirty-six
cases in which the Solicitor General urged invalidation of state ac-
tion. Of those thirty-six cases, sixteen involve preemption issues.
An additional six cases involve commercial law matters in which
the underlying state action is ideologically liberal. The federalists'
likelihood of invalidating state action in these types of cases might
explain the significant variable. It may not be that the Solicitor
General influenced their vote but instead chose to urge invalida-
tion in cases in which the Justices were predisposed to invalidate
state action on issue-specific (preemption) or ideological (liberal)
grounds.
In sum, we see little evidence that federalists are influenced in
their votes to invalidate or validate state action by the states' ex-
pressions of what issues are of the most importance to them. When
the states filed amicus briefs, the only influence that we found for
the federalists went in the opposite direction of our hypotheses.
Justices Kennedy and Scalia were likely to invalidate state action
when thirty or more states supported that action. By contrast, Jus-
tices Kennedy and Scalia were more likely to validate state action
if nonprofit organizations support the validation of state action.
The filing of briefs by nonprofit organizations appears to have had
the most influence on the Justices but that influence is equally ap-
parent among federalists and nonfederalists. It is not a
distinguishing factor. Similarly, we were able to confirm previous
studies that suggest that the Solicitor General's views influence ju-
dicial behavior. When the Solicitor General urged validation of
state action, federalists and nonfederalists appeared equally influ-
enced. In the rare case in which the Solicitor General urges
invalidation of state action, however, some federalists appear in-
fluenced by that action. Overall, these data suggest that it makes
more sense for states to persuade nonprofit organizations or the
Solicitor General to file briefs urging validation of state action than
for states to band together to file their own brief urging validation
of state action. There is no evidence that federalists or nonfederal-
ists are persuaded by their efforts in orchestrating briefs signed by
thirty or more states.
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3. Issue Analysis
Although we expect federalists to have an overall restrained phi-
losophy (that is, a likelihood to validate state action), we
hypothesized that they might be inclined to invalidate state action
in cases involving preemption issues or voting rights issues. These
factors would mitigate against the restraint that we would other-
wise expect to find for a federalist judge. The following table
reports the results on all issues, including preemption and voting
rights.
TABLE 7: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES BY ISSUE 7
JUST[CE i
Blackmun .738 .878 .487 .848 .957 .899 .944 .861 .830
Brennan .714 .840 1.000 .824 .651 .821 .953 .867 .851
Kennedy .430 .915 .882" .829" .817" .805" .747 1.000 .465
Marshall .408 .628 1.000 .666 .493 .690 .799 .738 .742
O'Connor .796 .890 .734 .744 .814 .840 .911 .703 .636
Rehnquist .455 .844* .694* .563 .555 .395 .380 .434 .342
Scalia .470 .781* .793* .525 .425 .565 .424 .220 .360
Souter .842 .869 .849 .772 .815 .837 1.000 .680 .677
Stevens .683 .751 .372 .754 .897 .815 .904 .486 .869*
Thomas .306 .868* .610* .614 .365 .210 .597 .424 .249
White .580 .921" .599* .517 .594 .808 .582 .103* .278*
7" Beyond preemption and voting rights issues, we coded each case for the issue that
was presented, and we also included interaction effects to see if the Justices behaved
differently within issues if the state action was conservative or liberal. We found no
significant results for interaction effects. The issues we coded were procedural due
process, free speech (including freedom of association), equal protection (other than
voting), commercial or property issues (including noncriminal "takings" cases and
Dormant Commerce Clause cases), and religion (Establishment and Free Exercise
Clause cases). Because the issue category compresses related issues into a single
category, we decided to employ qualitative analysis to see if there was within-group
variation by the justices that might not be observed in quantitative analysis.
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a. Enforcing the Supremacy Clause
We expect federalists to be more likely to vote to invalidate state ac-
tion when preemption is an issue. The multivariate results support that
hypothesis: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
Thomas, and White are significantly more likely to vote to invalidate
state action when preemption issues are raised than in the baseline type
of case. Of equal importance, the nonfederalists are not more likely to
vote to invalidate when preemption is an issue, so there is clearly some-
thing about preemption cases that makes the federalist Justices more
likely to invalidate state action than the nonfederalists. The presence of
a preemption issue therefore counters the underlying tendency of fed-
eralists to act on the basis of judicial restraint.
b. Protecting Voting Rights
Professor Yoo postulates that a federalist would be particularly con-
cerned about voting rights issues. If he is correct, then we would have
another factor that would cause a federalist not to have a low invalida-
tion rate for cases involving state action. Accordingly, xwe examined
whether there was a significant correlation between the presence of a
voting rights issue4 and a Justice's vote to invalidate state action.
The predicted probabilities results reflect that the presence of a vot-
ing rights issue significantly increased the likelihood that Justice
Kennedy would invalidate state action!' This description of Justice
Kennedy as being particularly likely to invalidate state action in cases
involving voting rights issues may harmonize with Professor Lawrence
Friedman's argument that Justice Kennedy has become a more liberal,
activist jurist in some areas' As we discuss below, Justice Kennedy's
voting behavior could not be explained on overall ideological grounds
despite our initial bivariate findings. It may be the case that Justice
74For the purposes of our database, a voting fights issue was present in a case when
a case involved a voting-related equal protection question under the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment.
7-For Justices Brennan and Marshall, the presence of a voting rights issue was a
perfect predictor: They voted to invalidate state action in every voting rights case
before the Court when Rehnquist was Chief Justice. However, there was only one
voting rights case before the Court while they served under Chief Justice Rehnquist,
making this predictor not statistically meaningful.
76See Friedman, supra note 7, at 226.
1342 [Vol. 88:1301
Dissing States?
Kennedy's voting behavior on cases involving procedural due process
and criminal law are consistent with a conservative political ideology
because he is likely to validate state limitations on individual rights, but
his voting behavior on other issues-such as voting, free speech, and re-
ligion-are more consistent with a liberal political ideology. Because
our definitions of "liberal" and "conservative" were global, rather than
issue specific, we were only able to detect Justice Kennedy's political
conservatism on an issue-by-issue basis.
Our results, therefore, suggest that Justice Kennedy may be de-
scribed as a "Yoo" federalist in that he has an increased likelihood
to invalidate state action in cases involving voting rights issues.
That explanation, however, does not apply to the other federalists.
4. Ideology
As predicted by political scientists, we are not able to account
for the federalists' moderate level of invalidating state action on
the basis of federalism factors alone. Hence, we also assessed the
role that ideology plays in predicting judicial behavior. Our data
reflect that the role of ideology is significant for Justice Thomas
and, to a lesser extent, for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia. Table 8 reflects our predicted probabilities results for politi-
cal ideology.
TABLE 8: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES BY IDEOLOGY OF STATE ACTION
CONSERVATIVE LIBERALJUSTICE STATE AMTON SAEcnNDIFFERENCE
(BASELINE PROBABILITY) STATE ACTION
Blackmun .738 .368* -370
Brennan .714 .155* -.559
Kennedy .430 .404 -.026
Marshall .408 .030* -.378
O'Connor .796 .777 -.019
Rehnquist .455 .634 .179
Scalia .470 .634 .164
Souter .842 .607* -.235
Stevens .683 .401* -.282
Thomas .306 .726* .420
'White .580 .363 -.217
2002] 1343
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We find that the ideology of the state action played a significant
role in the decisions of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall,
Souter, Stevens, and Thomas, and there is a strong trend toward
significance for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.' The
"Difference" column reflects, however, that the federalists act on a
less pronounced ideological basis than the nonfederalists Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas are more likely
to invalidate liberal state actions than conservative state actions. If
they are federalists, then we would have to describe them as "con-
servative federalists." To the extent that some federalists insist that
Justices must act on the basis of neutral, nonideological principles,
then these Justices would not fit the federalism label. But if one be-
lieves that federalism and conservatism are compatible, then we
have demonstrated that these Justices belong in the conservative
federalist category. Their ideological tendencies may be causing
them to invalidate state action more than we would expect from a
federalist who is committed to judicial restraint. These federalists
are not merely invalidating state action to preserve separation of
powers principles but are also invalidating state action to impose a
conservative political ideology on the states.
The real surprise is that Justice Scalia does not have a strong,
overall significant value for ideology, although there is a trend in
that direction (p=.071)." We find, however, that Justice Scalia's re-
sults would be significant for ideology if we limited our
investigation to the 1991 Term forward, when Justice Thomas
joined the Court.' In other words, Justice Scalia's voting does not
correlate with ideology for the entire Rehnquist Court era, but
does for the period when the federalists are in the majority. His
nFor Chief Justice Rehnquist, p=0.062 and for Justice Scalia, p=0.071.
Is The difference column ranged from -.217 to -.559 for the nonfederalists and from
-.026 to +.420 for the federalists.
"In other words, the probability of observing these data were there no association
between our ideology variable and Justice Scalia's votes is approximately 7%.
'*Justice Scalia's predicted probability for invalidating conservative state action is
28.0%, and his predicted probability for invalidating liberal state action is 8.3%.
These results are significant at the p < 0.001 level. Full results for Justice Scalia after
1991 are reported in the Appendix. Chief Justice Rehnquist's voting behavior after




pattern of voting on an ideological basis, therefore, appears to have
been influenced by the Court's membership. Possibly, Justice
Thomas has influenced Justice Scalia's voting behavior in a conser-
vative, ideological direction.
Our data, however, do not support the view that Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor vote on a predictable, conservative basis. As
discussed above, Justice Kennedy may be an eclectic conservative
in that he voted as a conservative on cases involving procedural
due process and criminal law but not in cases involving free speech
and religion. Our data also support the commonly held view that
Justice O'Connor is a moderate swing voter who cannot be de-
scribed in predictable ideological terms.'
III. QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
In the previous Part, we used quantitative analysis to assess
whether principles of federalism can predict whether some mem-
bers of the Court will vote to invalidate state action. These
arguments do not stem from consideration of the votes of a bloc of
Justices; they derive from empirical analysis in which the vote of a
single Justice is the dependent variable. We also found that quanti-
tative analysis was a limited vehicle for discussing the relevance of
the issues present in a case.'
In this Part, we engage in qualitative analysis to discuss the votes
of the so-called federalists when they vote as a bloc, with careful
attention to the relevance of the issues in the cases. First, we will
examine cases in which at least four of the federalist Justices voted
to invalidate state action and no more than two of the nonfederal-
ists voted to invalidate state action. Second, we will examine cases
in which at least four of them voted to validate state action when
81 Although President Reagan described Anthony Kennedy as a "true conservative"
when he nominated him to the Supreme Court, Professor Lawrence Friedman argues
that Justice Kennedy's decisions on free speech and religion cases defy that label.
Friedman, supra note 7, at 225-28. Similarly, Justice O'Connor is often portrayed as
the moderate, swing vote on the Court. See, e.g., Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall
Kelso, Sandra Day O'Connor: A Justice Who Has Made a Difference in
Constitutional Law, 32 McGeorge L. Rev. 915, 926-35 (2001) (discussing cases where
Justice O'Connor provided the fifth deciding vote).
As noted above, supra note 73, the issue categories included too many different
subject areas for meaningful quantitative analysis.
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no more than two of the nonfederalists voted to validate state ac-
tion. These cases reflect the contrast between the federalists and
nonfederalists because they reached different outcomes in these
cases.
A. Votes to Invalidate State Action
The five federalists have now collectively been members of the
Court for a decade. Of the 111 cases in which the Rehnquist Court
voted to invalidate state action since 1991, forty-eight were matters
that were decided by a unanimous vote. Of the sixty-three cases in-
volving a divided Court, fifteen were not joined by a majority of
the nonfederalists' on the Court. In all but one of those cases, all
five federalists joined the majority and no more than two of the
nonfederalists joined the majority. In the remaining case, four fed-
eralists joined the majority along with two nonfederalists.
In addition to the fifteen cases in which the federalists voted to
invalidate state action and the Court also voted to invalidate state
action, there were two more cases in which at least four federalists
voted to invalidate state action, but the Court as a whole voted to
validate state action. In these two remaining cases, all four nonfed-
eralists plus one federalist formed a majority to validate state
action over the objection of four federalists. Hence, there were a
total of seventeen cases in which at least four federalists voted to
invalidate state action and no more than two nonfederalists voted
to invalidate state action.
Seven of these cases involved equal protection issues, four in-
volved property issues, three involved religion issues, two involved
free speech issues, and one involved preemption issues. In thinking
about these seventeen cases, we asked why federalists would vote
to invalidate state action when nonfederalists did not. Are these
decisions consistent with any of the tenets of federalism or do they
need to be explained on some other ground?
83For the purpose of this discussion, we are including Justice White in the
"nonfederalist" category because he voted with the "nonfederalist" bloc on most
cases outside the abortion context during the 1991 and 1992 Terms. As noted above,
supra note 4, the other Justices whom we include in the "nonfederalist" category are
Justices Blackmun, Breyer, Marshall, Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg.
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TABLE 9: NONUNANIMOUS CASES IN WHICH AT LEAST FOUR
FEDERALISTS AND No MORE THAN Two NONFEDERALISTS
VOTED TO INVALIDATE STATE ACrIoN
PARTY NAMES CITATION YEARI ISSUES
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003 1992 Fifth Amendment "taking"
Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 1993 Equal Protection, congressional
redistricting
C&A Carbone v. Clarkstown 511 U.S. 383 1994 Interstate Commerce Clause
Dolan v. City of Tigard 512 U.S. 374 1994 Fifth Amendment "taking"
Capitol Square Review & Advi- 515 U.S. 753 1995 Establishment Clause
sory Bd. v. Pinette
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 515 U.S. 819 1995 Establishment Clause
of the Univ. of Va.
Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900 1995 Equal Protection, congressional
redistricting
Shaw v. Hunt 517 U.S. 899 1996 Equal Protection, congressional
redistricting
Bush v. Vera 517 U.S. 952 1996 Equal Protection, congressional
redistricting
Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice 521 U.S. 567 1997 Equal protection, congressional
redistricting
Rice v. Cayetano 528 U.S. 495 2000 Fifteenth Amendment, voting
scheme
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones 530 U.S. 567 2000 First Amendment right of associa-
_ _ _ _ 
tion
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale 530 U.S. 640 2000 First Amendment right of expres-
sive association
Hunt v. Cromartie 532 U.S. 234 2001 Equal protection, congressional
redistricting
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. 533 U.S. 98 2001 First Amendment right of free ex-
Sch. pression; Establishment Clause
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 533 U.S. 606 2001 Fifth Amendment "taking"
Lorillard v. Reilly 533 U.S. 525 2001 Preemption & First Amendment
right of free speech
In examining the list of cases in which the federalists created the
decisive voting bloc, it appears that two important categories of
cases are "takings" cases and equal protection cases involving
Congressional redistricting. In addition, several of the cases involve
different aspects of the First Amendment: the Free Exercise
Clause, the right to free association, and the Religion Clause. We
will examine cases from each of these categories to see whether
they are consistent with the tenets of federalism or can instead be
explained on ideological grounds.
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1. Takings Cases
We coded the "commercial" variable in the database, expecting
to find a correlation between the presence of a property issue and
the votes by some federalists. The variable is significant for Justice
Kennedy but not for the other members of the Court. A qualitative
assessment suggests that the Court has acted in an activist fashion
to protect the rights of property owners. For some federalists, these
results are reflected in the database through the significant factor
of protecting conservative ideology. Justice O'Connor did not vote
as consistently with the federalists on these cases as one might ex-
pect: She was not more likely to invalidate cases that reviewed a
liberal state action than a conservative state action.
The first important takings case decided by the Rehnquist Court
since 1991 was Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.' The Lu-
cas litigation stems from Congress's 1972 enactment of the Coastal
Zone Management Act.' In the 1980 amendments to this Act,
Congress gave states a financial incentive to develop a program to
eliminate development and redevelopment in high-hazard areas.'
South Carolina enacted various measures to implement this direc-
tive, including the 1988 Beachfront Management Act. This Act
enlarged the areas protected from development. This new bound-
ary included property purchased by Lucas for redevelopment in
1986. After briefing and arguing before the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, but prior to issuance of the court's opinion, the
Beachfront Management Act was amended to permit Lucas to
seek a special use permit' Lucas never applied for such a permit,
and the possibility of his receiving such a permit was not a factor in
the decision entered by the state supreme courtY The United
States Supreme Court accepted certiorari in the case on the factual
assumption from the trial court that the land had been rendered
- 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2000).
16 U.S.C. § 1456b(a)(2).
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valueless by the amendment to the Beachfront Management Act.'
It ruled in favor of the property owner, Lucas.9'
The Court had to interpret the ripeness doctrine liberally to hear
the case at all. In his dissenting opinion, in which he argued that
the writ should be dismissed because it was improvidently granted,
Justice Stevens argued that there were facts in the record disputing
Lucas's claim that his land had no value. Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent makes a similar assertion. The fact that the five federalists on
the Court were eager to hear the case is baffling in light of their
general position on the question of ripeness and their previous de-
cision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.' The temporary nature of
the taking, coupled with Lucas's admission at trial that he was "in
no hurry" to build "because the lot was appreciating in value"'
9 Id. at 1020.
K Id. at 1031-32.
9 Id. at 1061-62 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
9Justice Blackmun noted that the lot had increased in value despite no construction
on the property. Id. at 1043 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
94Two weeks before deciding the Lucas case, the Court held in an environmental
law case-Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)-that the plaintiffs had
not demonstrated a concrete injury sufficient to support standing under existing
precedent. The plaintiffs claimed that their desire to use or observe an animal species
was potentially harmed by a regulation of the Department of Interior. This regulation
allegedly increased the rate of extinction of endangered or threatened species. Id. at
562-67. The 7-2 majority decision was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Thomas, and White, although Justice Stevens would
have reversed on grounds other than standing. Id. at 581-82 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that Congress did not intend the consultation requirement to apply to
activities in foreign countries). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor dissented. The
Court required that the plaintiffs offer a "description of concrete plans" to return to
places where they observed the animals, id. at 564, or that the "injury proceed with a
high degree of immediacy," id. at 565 n.2, to support a finding of the actual or
imminent injury required by the law of standing. "Where there is no actual harm," the
Court required that its "imminence (though not its precise extent) must be
established." Id. In the majority's opinion, the mere fact that the plaintiffs had visited
in the past the areas that would be potentially affected by the new regulation "proves
nothing." Id. at 564. Such "some day" intentions did not meet the Court's requirement of
an "actual or imminent" injury. Id.
The ripeness decision in Lujan is perfectly explainable as being consistent with a
conservative judicial philosophy that avoids adjudication unless a case is properly ripe
for dispute. Justice O'Connor's dissent from the ripeness issue reflects the
quantitative result that her votes do not significantly associate with a conservative
ideological perspective.9s Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1052 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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gave the Court ample foundation to conclude that intervention into
this matter was unnecessary because there was no real economic
loss. Nonetheless, the Court chose to decide Lucas on the merits.
More importantly, resolving Lucas on the merits appears to be
inconsistent with principles of federalism. Due respect for separa-
tion of powers should have caused the Court to respect the
legislative structure created in the federal Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, whereby Congress used its spending power authority to
encourage the state to implement certain policies. No one ques-
tioned whether South Carolina complied with that federal directive
in the Beacfront Management Act. Nonetheless, Lucas made a
constitutional argument that South Carolina's rules constituted a
taking without just compensation. 96
Lucas is the story of a Court eager to intervene to protect the
rights of property owners. The decision of the Court was inconsis-
tent with the policies of the State of South Carolina and the United
States Congress, and contrary to the decision of the state's supreme
court. Moreover, there were strong prudential considerations
counseling the Court to dismiss the case as not ripe or dismiss the
writ as improvidently granted. The Court's interference dismantled
a program of federal-state cooperation.
The result can be better understood in terms of conservative
ideology-laissez-faire economics-than as an expression of pro-
tection of state sovereignty. Under a state sovereignty explanation,
one would have expected it to matter to the Court that both the
state legislature and the highest state court concluded that this par-
tial taking was appropriate as a matter of policy (legislature) and of
law (courts). Laissez-faire, conservative ideology appears to have
trumped federalism in this case. '
Id. at 1008-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91 Laissez-faire ideology can also explain the results in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (requiring city to meet an "essential nexus" test between
legitimate state interests and the permit condition exacted by city), and Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (finding the case ripe for review and
remanding for determination under analytic scheme established in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). In Dolan, the Court created a
new and higher standard that a city must meet when it conditions a permit on certain
land-use conditions. This new standard gives increased protection for landowners
subject to state regulation. In Palazzolo, the Court was activist, as in Lucas, in hearing
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2. Equal Protection Cases Involving Congressional Redistricting
We separated out voting cases from other types of equal protec-
tion cases, in part to test Professor Yoo's hypothesis about the
importance of voting issues to federalists. Because we broke the
equal protection cases into two categories-voting and nonvot-
ing-we had too few cases to examine the interaction between
ideology and issues on a quantitative basis. Hence, we examined
this interaction through qualitative analysis.
The equal protection cases involving congressional redistricting
can be seen as reflecting the ideological trend that we found in our
quantitative results. Aside from Justice O'Connor, the federalists
voted consistently in voting rights cases that supported a "reverse
discrimination" principle, commonly associated with political con-
servatism. Despite their consistent voting behavior on this issue,
our quantitative results did not reflect that these results were sig-
nificant on "issue" grounds; instead, they were significant on
"ideological" grounds."
The first and most complex case in this category is Shaw v.
Reno." In Shaw, the State of North Carolina became entitled to a
twelfth seat in the United States House of Representatives as a re-
sult of the 1990 United States Census. The General Assembly
enacted a reapportionment plan that included one majority-black
congressional district.' ® The United States Attorney General ob-
jected to the plan pursuant to Section Five of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and the General Assembly passed new legislation cre-
ating a second majority-black district. 1' A three-judge panel
dismissed the action and an appeal was taken to the United States
Supreme Court.1' The Court held the plaintiffs had stated a proper
claim upon which relief could be granted under the Equal Protec-
a case with arguable ripeness problems. The holding in the case also reflected laissez-
faire principles in protecting the interests of the private property owner.
98The only exception to this trend was Justice Kennedy, whose votes were
predictable on the basis of the voting rights issue rather than ideology. See supra
Section ll.B for a discussion of Kennedy's quantitative results on the voting issue.
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
1' Id. at 634.
10, Id. at 634-35.
"m Id. at 637-39 (citing Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992)).
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tion Clause and remanded the case for further consideration."
This decision reflected a dramatic change in precedent because the
Court had never before sided with white plaintiffs in a voting rights
case
.14
On remand, the state continued to defend its second majority-
minority district. Although a three-judge panel held that this ap-
portionment scheme was constitutional, the Supreme Court again
reversed, holding that the reapportionment scheme was not nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'O
Following the Court's second decision involving the majority-
minority district, the state redrew the second majority-minority dis-
trict."3 A three-judge panel granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs, concluding that race was impermissibly used as a fac-
tor in this new congressional redistricting."0 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed that decision, concluding that triable issues
of fact existed regarding whether the state had an impermissible
racial motive when it drew the district lines."3 On remand, the
three-judge panel concluded that the state had unconstitutionally
drawn the 1997 boundaries. 0 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
again reversed the three-judge panel, with Justice O'Connor join-
ing the Court's liberals."' Other than Justice O'Connor, the Court's
federalists therefore concluded that the state's redistricting plan
was unconstitutional. As we saw in the "takings" area, Justice
O'Connor did not consistently acquiesce to the conservative ideol-
ogy reflected in the opinions of the other federalists, which is
consistent with our nonideological empirical finding for Justice
O'Connor.
1"3Id. at 658.
114 The most fractured earlier case on this issue was United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), in which the Court upheld the use of race in drawing
district lines.
W0 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 902 (1996).
10 See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 543-44 (1999).
11 Id. at 545 (citing Cromartie v. Hunt, 34 F. Supp.2d 1029 (E.D.N.C. 1998)).
"'Id. at 554.
109 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 239-41 (2001) (citing Cromartie v. Hunt, 133
F. Supp. 2d 407 (E.D.N.C. 2000)).
11 Id. at 237, 258-59.
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Of the three groups of opinions in this case-one group finding
the state's conduct constitutional throughout, one group finding
the state's conduct unconstitutional throughout, and one Justice
finding the state's conduct moving from unconstitutional to consti-
tutional-it would appear that Justice O'Connor's decision is the
most federalist in that she tries to protect the integrity of the voting
system while also respecting state sovereignty. Under this view, the
State of North Carolina found itself in an untenable position. If it
did not comply with the Attorney General's request that it create a
second majority-minority district, then it would certainly face legal
challenge from the Executive Branch. But if it did comply with the
Attorney General's request, it would face legal challenge from
white voters. Because North Carolina initially created only one
majority-minority district, it would appear, at least at first, that it
preferred not to comply with the Attorney General's request. Un-
der that view, one might understand the Court's initial decision as
respecting state sovereignty by giving the state an opportunity to
defy the intrusion of the federal government. In the second round
of litigation, however, one might understand the state to desire
genuinely to create a second majority-minority district. This time, it
apparently chose a configuration different from the one selected by
the Attorney General. This configuration arguably reflected a de-
sire by the legislature to protect its own political interests while
also complying with federal law.
Most importantly, this case reflects the ideological nature of this
line of decisions for the federalists. Until the Court decided Shaw
v. Reno, it was considered constitutional for a state to use race in
drawing district lines. Although the Court was growing increasingly
divided on this question, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun and Stevens, had stated in a plurality opinion in United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey... [" UJO"] that the Court's prior de-
cisions implied that
[T]he Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the Vot-
ing Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving black
majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reap-
portionment plan complies with § 5 .... Section 5 and its
430 U.S. 144,147 (1977).
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authorization for racial redistricting where appropriate to avoid
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color are con-
stitutiona 112
The only member of the current federalist majority who was on
the Court when UJO was decided was then-Justice Rehnquist. Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined Part IV of the plurality opinion in which
Justices White, Stevens, and Rehnquist concluded that the Consti-
tution permits the State to draw lines deliberately in such a way
that the percentage of districts with a nonwhite majority roughly
approximates the percentage of nonwhites in the county, because
there was no cognizable discrimination against whites.' - Part IV of
the Court's opinion in UJO, however, did suggest that a state
would have to employ "sound districting principles such as com-
pactness and population equality" to draw district lines in a race-
conscious fashion.114 Only Chief Justice Burger dissented, conclud-
ing that the Court's prior precedent held that "drawing of political
boundary lines with the sole, explicit objective of reaching a prede-
termined racial result cannot ordinarily be squared with the
Constitution."
5
The Supreme Court did not expressly question the UJO holding
in Shaw, although it did emphasize the "sound district principles"
and "compactness" language from UJO that no more than four
members of the Court (if one includes Chief Justice Burger) had
accepted. The emphasis on these Shaw principles therefore reflects
a philosophical shift on the part of the Court. It no longer was suf-
ficient for a state to argue that its use of explicit racial criteria in
redistricting was necessary and appropriate under the Voting
Rights Act as a remedial measure to comply with the Fourteenth
112 Id. at 161.
113 Justice White wrote:
There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation the State deliberately
used race in a purposeful manner. But its plan represented no racial slur or
stigma with respect to whites or any other race, and we discern no
discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment nor any abridgement of
the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 165 (White, Stevens, & Rehnquist, JJ.).
114 Id. at 168.
11- Id. at 181 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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and Fifteenth Amendments. A state also needed to show that the
redistricting was consistent with traditional districting principles.
One legacy of the Rehnquist Court will be that it created this phi-
losophical or doctrinal change in the law of voting."6
3. First Amendment Cases
For the purpose of quantitative analysis, we grouped together
cases involving free speech and freedom of association. Religion
cases were coded separately but they included both Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause issues. Because these First Amendment
cases involved a multitude of issues, we thought it would be useful
to examine them qualitatively.
The religion cases in which the federalists voted as a bloc in-
volved Establishment Clause principles."7 In both cases, the Court
held that intermingling of the State with private parties that were
expressing a religious belief did not violate Establishment Clause
principles."' These decisions were consistent with our finding that
the federalists act in support of a conservative political ideology.
As we will discuss in Section HIL.B, the votes of the federalists in
16In its most recent voting rights case, Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), the
Court reversed the finding of the three-judge district court that North Carolina
violated the Constitution in its attempt to comply with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993). In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the "traditional districting
principles" framework established in Reno. Hunt, 532 U.S. at 258. The only member
of the majority in Hunt v. Cromartie who had been a member of the Court when UJO
was decided was Justice Stevens, and he had joined the traditional districting
principles language in UJO. The other nonfederalists on the current Court-Justices
Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg-joined the majority in Hunt v. Cromartie without a
separate concurrence. Hence, no liberal member of the Court has recently taken a
position similar to the UJO position that race can be a legitimate factor in the
remedial, racial context without further justification such as concerns for traditional
districting principles. Although four of the Court's federalists did not join the majority
opinion in Hunt v. Cromartie, their dissenting opinion clearly supports the legal
framework in which considerations of traditional districting principles are important
to the determination of constitutionality. Hunt, 532 U.S. at 256-57. The "price" for
the holding in Hunt that the State acted constitutionally may therefore have been a
doctrinal shift by the Court's liberal wing to require more justification than under
UJO for race-conscious redistricting principles. Equal protection embraced a more
conservative ideology.
u7Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
M Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.
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cases in which they voted to validate state action also follow this
trend toward the Court supporting a conservative political ideol-
ogy.
Another cluster of First Amendment cases reflect the evolution
of a conservative jurisprudence on the freedom to associate or
freedom not to associate. The first of these cases, California De-
mocratic Party v. Jones,"9 involved a novel issue of a state initiative
that created a new blanket primary system to replace the state's
closed partisan primary. The Court held that California's blanket
primary violated the political parties' First Amendment right of as-
sociation. Although the decision in this case may have appeared
relatively noncontroversial at the time and was decided by a 7-2
vote, it reflected the beginning of a reinvigorated "freedom to as-
sociate" which seems to be ideologically important to the
federalists.
At first glance, the votes by the federalists in California Democ-
ratic Party are surprising. The issue in the case was the right of the
citizens of California to enforce a statewide initiative that imposed
a blanket primary on the state of California. Four political parties
challenged this new state rule, arguing that it violated their free-
dom not to associate by possibly forcing them to accept a nominee
for a particular party when that nominee's positions were not con-
sistent with those of the party."' The federalists, joined by Justices
Breyer and Souter, voted to invalidate this state law. In dissent,
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg observed that "principles of federal-
ism require us to respect the policy choice made by the State's
voters in approving Proposition 198.""
Even if principles of federalism did not compel the decision in
this case for the federalists, it is also surprising that the federalists
interpreted the freedom not to associate so broadly. The First
Amendment does not explicitly refer to a "freedom to associate."
Such a broad construction of an implied term is usually the hall-
mark of liberalism, not federalism. Hence, it is not surprising that
the Court supported its reference to the importance of the freedom
530 U.S. 567 (2000).
See id. at 571.
' Id. at 576.
" Id. at 591 (Stevens & Ginsburg, 1., dissenting).
[Vol. 88:13011356
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not to associate with citation to Professor Lawrence Tribe's treatise
on American Constitutional Law'z and a "liberal" decision from
the Burger era-Roberts v. United States Jaycees124 -in which the
Court found that the state regulation had not impermissibly inter-
fered with the right not to associate.'m The decision in California
Democratic Party, coupled with the Court's unanimous decision in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton,' appears to reflect the federalists' increasing comfort with a
newly invigorated freedom not to associate. Although this view has
not been expressed in any of the theoretical writings on federalism,
it may be consistent with the laissez-faire, conservative ideology
discussed above. Under that view, state governments, like the fed-
eral government, should not interfere with the decisions of private
individuals. The right to be free from government interference
trumps federalism.
A First Amendment case from the 2000 Term reinforces the in-
creasing importance to the federalists of the freedom not to
associate. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court had to de-
termine whether applying New Jersey's public accommodation law
to the Boy Scouts violated their First Amendment right of expres-
sive association. Once again, the federalist majority cited Roberts v.
United States Jaycees for the proposition that the right of freedom
of association "plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."'"
Like the Court's earlier decision in Hunt v. Cromartie,'29 the
Court had to contend with some factual issues to reach its holding.
But unlike Cromartie, the federalists expressed a willingness to
"independently review the factual record to ensure that the state
court's judgment does not unlawfully intrude on free expression."130
- Id. at 574-75 (quoting Professor Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law
791 (1978)).
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
Id. at 630-31.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
1 Id. at 647-48.
12 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (investigating whether state's congressional redistricting plan
met the factual criteria for an unconstitutional racial gerrymander); see also supra
note 116.
-Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648-49.
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The Justices needed to determine whether the Boy Scouts engaged
in expressive association and, if so, whether the forced inclusion of
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy
Scouts' ability to advocate public or private viewpoints." The
Court concluded that the Boy Scouts engages in expressive associa-
tion without any reference to the holdings of the lower courts on
this issue." It then turned to resolution of the second issue. It
noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court had determined that the
Boy Scouts' ability to disseminate its message was not significantly
altered by the forced inclusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmas-
ter." The Court disagreed with those findings."M An independent
review of the record therefore caused the majority to reach a con-
clusion that was contrary to the conclusion of the state supreme
court. The dissenters agreed that an independent review of the fac-
tual record was appropriate, but, based on that review, the dissent
would have upheld the conclusions of the state's highest court
35
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Boy Scouts discussed the
federalism issues that are implicit in the case. The dissent made a
passing reference to the fact that:
The State of New Jersey has decided that people who are open
and frank about their sexual orientation are entitled to equal
access to employment as schoolteachers, police officers, librari-
ans, athletic coaches, and a host of other jobs filled by citizens
who serve as role models for children and adults alike.'
But the dissenters did not note the irony in the fact that the feder-
alists were invalidating a provision of a state statute that had also
been upheld by the state's highest court in a judicial framework in
which they did not need to defer to the findings of that court. Nor
did the dissenters note the irony in the willingness of the Court's
"conservatives" to develop a constitutional protection that is, at
best, implied in the Constitution. In the hands of the majority, the
right to free speech became a right to associate, which became a
1 Id. at 650.
- Id. at 652.
11Id. at 654.
Id. at 655.
135 Id. at 687-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'3 Id. at 698 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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right not to associate, which then became a right not to expres-
sively associate. One might have expected the federalists to be
more cautious in developing these unwritten rights.
The majority's decision, however, can be explained by the Court's
conservative assumption that state regulation of conduct is suspect.
New Jersey's public accommodation law therefore did not receive the
same level of presumed judicial acceptance as the public accommoda-
tion law at issue in Roberts v. United States Jaycees. It is hard to know
if the Court is generally more skeptical of public accommodation
laws, or simply skeptical of ones that regulate discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. This Court's willingness to strike down
portions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act' and the
Americans with Disabilities Act" suggests that its conservative atti-
tude is not limited to sexual orientation matters.
It is probably not surprising that we could not discern a federal-
ist thread to the First Amendment cases, because it has been a
bedrock principle for several generations that the free speech, re-
ligion, and freedom of association doctrines are the same in actions
involving the state and federal governments. "' As a theoretical
matter, however, it would have been possible for the Court to have
sought to develop a more state-friendly jurisprudence in the
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
m See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
'9 In Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249
(1833), the Court held that the rights guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment do not
apply to the states. This principle has since been extended to the first eight amendments.
In 1873, the Court held in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-82
(1873), that the rights guaranteed in the first eight amendments are not "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" and therefore do not apply to the states
via the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since
Slaughter-House, the Court has gradually incorporated the first eight amendments
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applying the same
principles for state and federal conduct. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (incorporating the Religion Clause); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947) (incorporating the privilege against self-incrimination); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (incorporating the Double Jeopardy Clause). The
Court, however, has never embraced the total incorporation theory articulated by
Justice Black in Adamson v. California and, specifically, has never incorporated "the
Second and Third Amendments, the Fifth Amendment's requirement of grand jury
indictment, and the Seventh Amendment." Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional
Law 784 (2nd ed. 1991).
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speech, religion, and association areas when state action rather
than federal action was at stake.' 0 Until recently, in fact, the Court
accepted different equal protection principles when evaluating
state and federal action.' But we see no evidence that the federal-
ists have tried to create more deferential standards for the states
than the federal government in the speech, religion, and associa-
tion areas.
B. Votes to Validate State Action
There were twenty-seven cases in which the federalists voted to
validate state action and the nonfederalists predominantly voted to
invalidate state action. It is not surprising that federalists would
vote to validate state action given our hypothesis with regard to ju-
dicial restraint and respect for state sovereignty for federalists.
Nonetheless, these cases also support the ideological trends that we
found in the invalidation cases.
Seventeen of these cases involved criminal law issues, two in-
volved religion issues, five involved free speech or association
issues, and the remaining involved assorted issues like substantive
due process, property issues, and equal protection. They are re-
ported in Table 10.
140Professor John Yoo, in fact, would appear to support that development in
constitutional law. See Yoo, supra note 33.
141 The Court created a uniform equality standard in Adarand Constnictors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). We note, however, that the different equality standards
that the Court employed before Adarand were actually more stringent with respect to
state than federal conduct because the Constitution does not explicitly contain an
equal protection clause that governs federal action. The equal protection principle
had to be inferred from the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to cover the
federal government. The differing equality standards, however, were based on the
language and history of the Constitution. Hence, it was theoretically possible for the
Court to have determined that the free speech principle should be applied more
strictly against the federal government than state governments given that the principle
is explicitly mentioned with respect to the federal government and only impliedly
found for state government.
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TABLE 10: NONUNANiOUS CASES IN WHICH AT LEAST FOUR
FEDERALISTS AND No MORE THAN Two NONFEDERALISTS
VOTED TO VALIDATE STATE ACTION
PARTY NAMES CITATION YEAR ISSUES
Burdick v. Takushi 504 U.S. 428 1991 free speech/association
Zobrest v. Catalina 509 U.S. 1 1993 religion
Heller v. Doe 509 U.S. 312 1993 criminal law
Johnson v. Texas 509 U.S. 350 1993 criminal law
Romano v. Oklahoma 512 U.S. 1 1994 criminal law
Dep't of Revenue v. 511 U.S. 767 1994 criminal law
Kurth Rd.
Sandin v. Conner 515 U.S. 472 1995 substantive due process
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 515 U.S. 618 1995 free speech/association
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 515 U.S. 646 1995 criminal law
Acton
Bennis v. Michigan 516 U.S. 442 1996 commercial/property
Montana v. Egelhoff 518 U.S. 37 1996 criminal law
Timmons v. Twin Cities 520 U.S. 351 1997 free speech/association
Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203 1997 religion
Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 1997 criminal law
Buchanan v. Angelone 522 U.S. 269 1998 criminal law
Ark. Educ. TV Comm'n 523 U.S. 666 1998 free speech/association
v. Forbes
Monge v. California 524 U.S. 721 1998 criminal law
Minnesota v. Carter 525 U.S. 83 1998 criminal law
Wyoming v. Houghton 526 U.S. 295 1999 criminal law
Illinois v. Wardlow 528 U.S. 119 2000 criminal law
Weeks v. Angelone 528 U.S. 225 2000 criminal law
Smith v. Robbins 528 U.S. 259 2000 criminal law
Garner v. Jones 529 U.S. 244 2000 criminal law
City of Erie v. Pap's AM. 529 U.S. 277 2000 free speech/association
Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 2000 equal protection
Texas v. Cobb 532 U.S. 162 2001 criminal law
Atwater v. Lago Vista 532 U.S. 318 2001 criminal law
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1. Criminal Law Cases
Although there were seventeen criminal law cases in which at
least four of the federalists voted to invalidate state action, none of
the federalists had a significant negative coefficient on the criminal
law variable. Their votes on these cases can be best understood as
reflecting the significant value of the conservative ideology vari-
able, because these cases all reflect states seeking to limit the rights
of prisoners or individuals accused of crimes. Of the seventeen
cases, Justice O'Connor did not vote with the federalists in five,"
which is consistent with the fact that we did not find that Justice
O'Connor had significant values on the criminal law or ideologi-
cally conservative variable."3
2. Religion Cases
The two religion cases in which the federalists voted to validate
state action and the liberals voted to invalidate state action-
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District" and Agostini v. Fel-
ton "5-involved the Establishment Clause. Justice O'Connor
dissented in one of these cases, continuing her pattern of not voting
identically with the other federalists.' Justice O'Connor would
14See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518
U.S. 37 (1996); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Johnson v.
Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
143 Justice Kennedy's qualitative results are a bit difficult to explain in light of the
quantitative findings. He did vote to validate state action in each of the criminal law
cases discussed above, yet his predicted probability score for cases involving criminal
law issues was not significant. That fact may be explained by closer examination of the
model we used for the predicted probabilities analysis. The issue of procedural due
process was the baseline issue in our predicted probabilities analysis. Justice Kennedy
had a relatively low rate of invalidating state action for that subject area with an
overall predicted probability of 43.0%. His predicted probability for criminal law was
also comparatively low at 46.5%. Hence, he had a low value for both procedural due
process and criminal law. Because our predicted probabilities model compared each
issue with procedural due process, Justice Kennedy did not have a significant result
for criminal law. Had our baseline model used, by contrast, equal protection, then we
would have had a significantly lower result for criminal law. Thus, our predicted
probability result of 46.5% for Justice Kennedy on criminal law is consistent with our
qualitative findings.
'M 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
14 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
146 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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have vacated and remanded the case to avoid reaching the consti-
tutional question.147
The decisions in these two cases evince a conservative political
ideology because the Court concluded in each case that state finan-
cial assistance to schools in various forms did not violate the
Establishment Clause. In Zobrest, the Court held that the Estab-
lishment Clause did not prohibit a state from providing a sign
language interpreter to a student attending a Catholic high school,
despite the fact that some of the messages transmitted by the inter-
preter would be religious."4 In Agostini, the Court held that it did
not violate the Establishment Clause for a Board of Education to
provide supplemental on-site remedial education to children attending
parochial schools.49 The Court overruled its prior precedent to reach
that result!' 0 As discussed above, these cases support a conservative
political ideology that can be found in all of the Court's recent Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence, but we see no evidence of
deference to state government as motivating this development.
3. Free Speech or Association Cases
There were five cases involving free speech or association issues.
One case-Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. ---involved a commer-
cial speech issue. The federalists (minus Justice Kennedy) voted to
validate state action, holding that a state could constitutionally bar
lawyers from using direct mail to solicit personal injury or wrongful
death clients within thirty days of an accident." The decision re-
flected four of the federalists (plus Justice Breyer) protecting the
state's right to regulate a speech and property interest.
Three of the remaining cases involved state regulation of the po-
litical process. In Burdick v. Takushi,53 the Court held that
Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting did not unreasonably in-
4 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
484 Id. at 3.
149 521 U.S. at 234-35.
- Id. at 208-09 (holding that Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), is not consistent
with the Court's subsequent Establishment Clause decisions and should be overruled).
15515 U.S. 618 (1995).
See id. at 620 (1995).
- 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
2002) 1363
1364 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 88:1301
fringe upon its citizens' rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments1 In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,'5  the
Court held that a state law prohibiting candidates from appearing
on ballots as a candidate of more than one political party did not
violate the freedom of association."5 In Arkansas Educational Tele-
vision Commission v. Forbes,'"5 the Court held that a broadcaster
could constitutionally exclude an independent political candidate
from a state-owned public television broadcast' 5 All five federal-
ists joined the majority opinion in the latter two cases, but Justice
Kennedy dissented from the Court's decision in Burdick. 9 If Pro-
fessor Yoo is correct that the federalists are particularly interested
in protecting the integrity of the political process, one might have
expected those cases to have been decided differently. Under Pro-
fessor Yoo's theory, the Court should have protected voting rights
at the state level by protecting the rights of voters to write-in can-
didates, facilitating the appearance of additional candidates on
ballots, and facilitating the free speech interests of candidates.
Finally, in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,"W the Court held that a
city's public indecency ordinance, which proscribed nudity in pub-
lic places, was a constitutional restriction of symbolic speech.6
Like the decision in Florida Bar, the Court validated a free speech
restriction that had an impact on the rights of property owners. 2
1 Id. at 430.
520 U.S. 351 (1997).
" Id. at 370.
523 U.S. 666 (1998).1
'sId. at 669.
"'This result is consistent with the commentary stating that Justice Kennedy does
not have a conservative voting pattern on free speech issues. See Friedman, supra
note 7.
- 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
161 d. at 282--83.
m Like the decision in Florida Bar, the Court's vote in City of Erie might reflect the
federalist Justices' ideological expression of what they consider to be distasteful
conduct. In City of Erie, they voted on the basis of what they considered to be morally
distasteful: public nudity. In Florida Bar, they voted on the basis of what they
considered to be professionally distasteful: lawyers soliciting clients by direct mail.
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4. Other Issues
There is only one case involving a substantive due process issue
in Table 10-Sandin v. Conner-but the decision in that case can
be understood as consistent with the criminal law results as re-
ported above."s Sandin involved a due process liberty interest of a
prisoner. The state action was conservative and involved the con-
duct of a prisoner." All five federalists voted to validate the state
action. Our regression results support the argument that the votes
of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas can
be explained by the fact that the state action was conservative."
(The case was decided after 1991, when Justice Scalia's votes could
be predicted on an ideological basis.)
Similarly, there is only one case in Table 10 involving a property
interest: Bennis v. Michigan." In Section II.A, we saw that the
federalists were often nonprotective of state property interests
when they perceived the state to be taking property from private
citizens. Nonetheless, Bennis is a takings case involving the valida-
tion of state action in which the federalists voted as a bloc.'67 In
Bennis, the state seized property after the spouse was convicted of
violating state law. The "private citizen" had a criminal law con-
nection and the challenged state action was conservative. Hence,
we can understand the votes of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas as being consistent with their ideologi-
cal voting. Justice Kennedy voted with the nonfederalists on this
case, which is consistent with the fact that he does not have a sig-
nificant coefficient for the liberal state action or criminal law
variables.
10 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
16 See id. at 474-77.
"' The issue in the case was whether a prisoner had a liberty interest in remaining
free of disciplinary segregation. In our coding, such a state action was deemed
conservative because it involved the restriction of individual rights in the criminal law
context. See supra note 57 (defining conservatism as including cases which restrict the
rights of criminal defendants).
M 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
16See id. Justice Kennedy dissented from the other federalists, while Justice
O'Connor concurred with the federalists and disagreed with the nonfederalists.
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Finally, there is the infamous decision in Bush v. Gore,"s which
technically validated the decision of the Florida Secretary of State
to certify the results of the 2000 Presidential election on behalf of
George W. Bush. In considering the votes in this case, it is impor-
tant to remember that our data cannot predict the result in any
discrete case. Our data merely reflect the pattern that emerges
from a series of decisions. We coded Bush v. Gore consistently with
our larger coding scheme-as an example of the Court validating
conservative state action-because it ruled for the state in a chal-
lenge brought on behalf of the voters.
Nevertheless, we determined the predicted probabilities for the
likelihood that various members of the Rehnquist Court would
vote to invalidate state action in Bush v. Gore given the character-
istics of the case: the fact that the state action was conservative,
that the Court accepted the case under its certiorari jurisdiction,
that no amicus briefs were filed, and that voting was at issue. We
found that the likelihood of voting to invalidate state action (that
is, voting for Gore) was as follows:
" Justice Kennedy (.598): His inclination to invalidate state ac-
tion on cases involving voting rights would make him more
likely than not to invalidate state action in this case, but the
fact that his likelihood of invalidating here is close to 0.5 sug-
gests that the case would be a close one for him.
* Justice O'Connor (.329): Her strong inclination to reverse
lower courts that invalidate state action would make her
more likely to vote to validate state action by reversing the
state's highest court. Her deference to lower state courts is
overridden by her even stronger propensity to reverse lower
courts that invalidate state action.
* Chief Justice Rehnquist (.367): His desire to preserve con-
servative state action coupled with his desire to reverse lower
courts that invalidate state action would make him more
likely than not to validate state action.
* Justice Scalia (.437): His desire to preserve conservative state
action coupled with his desire to reverse lower courts that in-
validate state action would make him more likely than not to
- 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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validate state action, but it would be a close case for him be-
cause of a trend toward significance on the voting rights
variable.
" Justice Souter (.761): His desire to invalidate conservative
state action would make him more likely than not to invali-
date state action.
" Justice Stevens (.187): His results are a bit surprising, but are
explained by the fact that he has a trend toward significance
on the voting rights issue (p=0.13) in the direction of validat-
ing state action when voting is the issue. That factor would
cause him to be more likely than not to put aside considera-
tion of the ideology of the state action and vote to validate
the state action.
" Justice Thomas (.272): His desire to preserve conservative
state action coupled with his desire to reverse lower courts
that invalidate state action would make him more likely than
not to validate state action.
Our results therefore suggest that ideological conservatism plus
a "policing function" (that is, reversing a lower court that had in-
validated state action) would predict that Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor would vote to validate
the state action in Bush v. Gore. For Justice Kennedy, however, we
would predict that his concern for voting rights issues would out-
weigh his desire to perform a "policing function." But, oddly, we
would predict a 5-4 vote with a majority comprised of Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Stevens. We would also
presume that Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, whom we did not
study, would vote consistently with Justice Souter for the purpose
of this prediction. We would predict that Justice Stevens's desire to
validate state action on voting rights cases would override his ideo-
logical liberalism. Justices Stevens and Kennedy, however, both
voted inconsistently with their overall trend lines. As we said pre-
viously, of course, our data are not designed to predict the votes in
discrete cases. The data is merely supposed to identify trends that
one could use to hypothesize a result.
More importantly, our data support the argument that the deci-
sion in Bush v. Gore is consistent with one model of federalism-
the "policing function" model-and inconsistent with another
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model of federalism-a concern for voting rights. Conservative
ideology appears to have been the tie-breaker between the pulls of
these two models of federalism, because conservative ideology
rendered results consistent with the "policing function" model. Al-
though Bush v. Gore caused some commentators to complain that
the federalists are sometimes inclined to vote on an ideological ba-
sis,1' we believe that a broader examination of the legacy of the
Rehnquist Court reflects that Bush v. Gore was not an unusual in-
trusion at all. Three of the federalists have shown themselves
willing to intervene in matters of state sovereignty for ideological
reasons, and those interventions can also be consistent with some
federalism principles. Thus, Bush v. Gore can be understood as re-
flecting both conservative ideology and federalism.
CONCLUSION: THE FEDERALISM LABEL REVISITED
Our results suggest that there is not one model of federalism op-
erating for the so-called federalists on the Rehnquist Court. Table
11 summarizes the results of our study."'
For example, Professor Jack Balkin argued that:
The same five conservative Justices who formed the majority in Bush v. Gore
had been engaged, for over a decade, in a veritable revolution in constitutional
doctrines concerning civil rights and federalism. In those decisions, the five
conservatives had been promoting a relatively consistent set of ideological
positions like colorblindness, respect for state autonomy from federal
interference, and protection of state governmental processes from federal
supervision. But the decision in Bush v. Gore did not seem to further those
values, at least not directly. Rather, the five conservatives seemed to adopt
whatever legal arguments would further the election of the Republican
candidate, George W. Bush.
Balkin, supra note 12, at 1408-09.
17Because we predicted that all Justices, irrespective of the "federalism" label,
would tend to vote consistently with the Solicitor General, we are not reporting those
results in this table. As reported previously, voting consistently with the Solicitor
General does not typically distinguish federalists from nonfederalists. See supra note






Our data suggest that the current federalist Justices employ at
least four different versions of federalism. Our results suggest that
the voting of the federalists can be predicted, in part, on the basis
of a "policing function," in that they are likely to reverse lower
courts that invalidate state action. Justice O'Connor's version of
federalism is consistent with this "policing" function, but she is also
more likely to affirm a lower state court than a lower federal court
when it validates state action. This result suggests that she has
more respect for lower state courts than lower federal courts. We
have fewer significant results for Justice O'Connor than for any
other Justice, making her voting record the hardest to predict. Her
reputation as the "swing vote" seems appropriate in light of our
data.
The second version of federalism predicts the voting behavior of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Like each of the fed-
eralists, they perform a "policing" function. They protect state
sovereignty by correcting errors by lower courts when they invali-
date state action. They also often protect separation of powers
principles by invalidating state action when a preemption issue is
present. Finally, they have an increased likelihood of invalidating
state action when the underlying state action is liberal.
The third version of federalism is very similar to the second ver-
sion and matches the voting behavior of Justice Scalia. Like the
other federalists, his results are consistent with the "policing" func-
tion. In addition, he has an increased likelihood of invalidating
state action when thirty or more states file briefs supporting state
action. This factor provides some evidence for the view of Justice
Scalia as independent.' Finally, Justice Scalia has a strong trend
toward significant results on the ideology factor for the entire time
period of our database and his results are significant after 1991,
when Justice Thomas joined the Court. These results suggest that
Justice Thomas's presence on the Court may have affected the
likelihood that Justice Scalia will vote on a conservative, ideologi-
cal basis. Although Justice Scalia does not have a significant value
on the voting rights variable, he voted identically with Justice
- Our results support the view that Justice Scalia acts independently on criminal
law cases. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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Thomas on all but one of the voting rights cases. Aside from Jus-
tice Scalia's tendency to invalidate state action when thirty or more
states support state action, Justices Scalia's voting records look
very similar to Justice Thomas's.
The fourth version of federalism predicts the voting behavior of
Justice Kennedy. Like the other federalists, his voting behavior re-
flects the "policing" function for the Court. In addition, he is more
likely to invalidate state action when a voting rights or preemption
issue is in a case. He also has an increased likelihood of validating
state action when nonprofit organizations support state action. Fi-
nally, he does not have a predisposition to vote on an ideological
basis.
Our data suggest that there is not one universally-followed
model for federalism on the Rehnquist Court. In other words, fed-
eralism does not appear to be a coherent philosophy for the
federalists on the Rehnquist Court. This inconsistency might sug-
gest that the Justices are using federalism instrumentally to achieve
ideological results that they desire rather than applying federalism
consistently. In a previous article, Professors Coker and Brudney
argued that the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is not
best understood as a federalism story." Instead, Professors Colker
and Brudney describe that jurisprudence, in part, as reflecting a
story about the Court wanting to assert more power for itself at the
expense of Congress, by defining the substantive meaning of the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. While our
current examination of cases involving the validity of state action
supports the notion that the federalists do operate under some fed-
eralism principles, our data also reflect that the core federalists-
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and Justice Scalia (after
1991)-have a propensity to act on the basis of conservative ideol-
ogy.
Our data do not support the argument expressed by some politi-
cal scientists that federalism plays no role in explaining the voting
behavior of the Supreme Court.' But it is also true that, while law
is not only politics, conservative ideology is an important predictor
7 See Colker & Brudney, supra note 3.
"7 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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of the voting behavior of the core federalists on the Rehnquist
Court. The operation of ideology may help create the incoherency
of federalism among the federalists on the Rehnquist Court.
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APPENDIX
Regression Results For Each Justice
The coding rules for most of the variables should be self-evident.
A positive result means that the Justice was inclined to invalidate
state action when the variable was significant. We have listed be-
low the coding of some variables that require explanation.
Liberal State Action: 0=conservative; 1=liberal
Appellate Review: 0=before Rule change, mandatory; 1=after
Rule change, discretionary
Free Speech: Includes Free Speech & Religion Clauses
Equal Protection : Includes equal protection excluding voting
rights issues
Voting: Voting issues under Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend-
ments
Commercial/Property: Noncriminal takings cases & Dormant
Commerce Clause
Religion: Freedom of Religion and Establishment Clause
Criminal: Criminal law issues relating to persons accused of
crime or in prison
Preemption: Supremacy clause
We also report results for interaction effects. Those effects are
noted in the results through the use of a multiplication symbol,
such as "Free Speech x Liberal State Action." An interaction result
allows us to investigate whether a Justice's propensity to invalidate
state action was contingent not just on the issue area but, for ex-
ample, on the issue and the ideology of the state action under
review. For example, it may be the case that Justice Blackmun
would be less likely to invalidate state action that expanded free-
dom of speech (liberal) but more likely to invalidate state action
that constricts free speech rights (conservative). This conclusion
would not be obvious from the results on the free speech variable,
so we constructed interaction terms to test this effect. We found no
cases where the interaction term was significant. This lack of sig-
13732002]
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nificance may be due to the fact that an interaction investigation
makes a small number of cases in any category even smaller. We
did not create an interaction term for preemption cases or those
dealing with commercial/property issues, because these issues did
not clearly fall on an ideological dimension. (Commercial/property
primarily included Dormant Commerce Clause which appeared to
be nonideological.)
There are incomplete results for Justices when a variable was a
perfect predictor, that is, the Justice either voted to invalidate all
the cases in the sub-category or voted to invalidate all of them. In
such an instance, it is not statistically appropriate to report the results.
Typically, this problem occurred when there were few instances of
that variable being present in the database, such as when we were
examining interaction effects.
Significant Results (p<.05, two-tailed test) are printed in boldface
Type and marked with an asterisk. The time period under investiga-
tion for each Justice is indicated in parentheses. The database is




VARIABLE NAME COEFF. ESOR Z P>IZI
Liberal State Action .0.9732 0.3072 -3.17 0.002*
Appellate Review -0.0928 02376 -0.39 0.696
Solicitor General-Amicus-Validate -0.6753 0.2112 -3.20 0.001*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Invalidate -0.3044 0-3693 -0.82 0.410
Federal Court Invalidates 0.1666 0.3593 0.46 0.643
State Court Validates 0.1199 03365 0.36 0.722
State Court Invalidates -0.7076 0.3461 -2.04 0.041*
One State in Favor -0.1280 0.3559 -0.36 0.719
2-10 States in Favor 1.0006 0.4156 2.41 0.016*
11-29 States in Favor -0.2644 0.2440 -1.08 0.279
30+ States in Favor -0.4786 0.4280 -1.12 0263
States Opposing 0.9870 0.8651 1.14 0.254
Interest Group Amicus -0.6470 0.2807 -2.30 0.021*
Free Speech 03909 0.4220 0.93 0.354
Free Speech x Liberal State Action -0.8580 0.7963 -1.08 0281
Equal Protection 1.0770 0.7499 1.44 0.151
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action -0.8377 0.9246 -0.91 0365
Voting -0.6706 0.9051 -0.74 0.459
Commercial/Property 0.6364 0.5042 126 0.207
Religion 0.9564 0.6268 1.53 0.127
Substantive Due Process 0.4493 0.7109 0.63 0.527
Substantive Due Process x Liberal State
Action -0.3494 1.1639 -0.30 0.764
Criminal 03177 03783 0.84 0.401
Preemption 0.5289 0.4867 1.09 0277
Constant 0.6368 0.4780 1.33 0.183
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BRENNAN (1986-1990)
VARIABLE NAME COEFF. z P>I
Liberal State Action -1.5797 0.4705 -3.36 0.001P
Appellate Review 0.8916 0.3780 2.36 0.018*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Validate -0.6174 03141 -1.97 0.049*
Solicitor General-Amicus-lnvalidate -1.4023 0.5447 -2.57 0.010*
Federal Court Invalidates 0.3029 0.6967 0.43 0.664
State Court Validates 0.6094 0.7339 0.83 0A06
State Court Invalidates -0.6835 0.6595 -1.04 0.300
One State in Favor 0.8249 0-5246 1-57 0.116
2-10 States in Favor 0.4116 0.5931 0.69 0A88
11-29 States in Favor 0.4713 0.4400 1.07 0.24
30+ States in Favor 1.6342 0.8852 1.85 0.065
Interest Group Amicus -0.4802 0.3951 -1.22 0.224
Free Speech 0.3848 0.6576 0.59 0.558
Free Speech x Liberal State Action -0.6245 0.9819 -0.64 0-525
Equal Protection -0.1776 0.8754 -0.20 0.839
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action 0.4121 1.1745 0.35 0.726
Commercial/Property 0.3521 0.7629 0.46 0.644
Religion 1.1081 0.8539 1.30 0.194
Substantive Due Process 0.5461 0.8597 0.64 0.525
Criminal 0.4740 0.5450 0.87 0.384
Preemption 0.4295 0.6709 0.64 0.522
Constant 0.5657 0.8499 0.67 0.506
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KENNEDY (1988-2001)
VARIABLE NAME COEFF. ERROR Z PzI
Liberal State Action -0.0670 0.2523 -0.27 0.791
Appellate Review 0.0270 0.2640 0.10 0.919
Solicitor General-Amicus-Validate -0.4298 0.1984 -2.17 0.030*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Invalidate 0.9584 0.3805 2.52 0.012"
Federal Court Invalidates -0.5846 0.2671 -2.19 0.029*
State Court Validates 0.0468 0.2517 0.19 0.852
State Court Invalidates -0.9358 0.2953 -3.17 0.002*
One State in Favor -0.1337 0.3021 -0.44 0.658
2-10 States in Favor 0.4655 0.2960 1.57 0.116
11-29 States in Favor -0.3020 0.2150 -1.40 0.160
30+ States in Favor 0.6691 0.3686 1.82 0.069
States Opposing 03216 0.5190 0.62 0.536
Interest Group Amicus -0.8095 0.2585 -3.13 0.002*
Free Speech 1.1254 0.3199 3.52 0.000*
Free Speech x Liberal State Action -0.4105 0.6025 -0.68 0.496
Equal Protection 1.0802 0.4397 2.46 0.014*
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action -0.9083 0.7158 -1.27 0.204
Voting 1.3587 0.5076 2.68 0.007*
Commercial/Property 1.0343 0.3760 2.75 0.006*
Religion 0.8398 0.4437 1.89 0.058
Criminal 0.0873 0.2814 0.31 0.756
Preemption 1.5451 0.4057 3.81 0.000*
Constant -0.1755 0.3425 -0.51 0.608
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MARSHALL (1986-1991)
VARIABLE NAME COEFF. SRRO Z P>[ZI
ERROR 11
Liberal State Action -1.6534 0.4117 -4.02 0.000*
Appellate Review 0.8642 03460 2.50 0.013"
Solicitor General-Amicus-Validate -0.2666 0.2999 -0.89 0374
Solicitor General-Amicus-Invalidate -0.9830 0.4623 -2.13 0.033*
Federal Court Invalidates 0.8410 0.5347 1.57 0.116
State Court Validates 0.8631 0.5187 1.66 0.096
State Court Invalidates 0.2028 0.4873 0.42 0.677
One State in Favor 0.6038 0.4899 1.23 0218
2-10 States in Favor 0.2099 0.5611 037 0.708
11-29 States in Favor 0.4481 0.4221 1.06 0.288
30+ States in Favor 1.1584 0.7884 1.47 0.142
Interest Group Amicus -0.2416 0.3646 -0.66 0.508
Free Speech 0.6602 0.5416 1.22 0223
Free Speech x Liberal State Action -0.2085 0.8792 -0.24 0.813
Equal Protection 0.2157 0.7440 0.29 0.772
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action 0.1987 1.0927 0.18 0.856
Commercial/Property 0.7270 0.6703 1.08 0.278
Religion 1.0703 0.7605 1.41 0.159
Substantive Due Process 0.8702 0.8020 1.08 0.278
Criminal 0.8810 0.4647 1.90 0.058
Preemption 0.5580 0.5732 0.97 0330




VARIABLE NAME COEFF. STD. zIERROR Z P>z
Liberal State Action -0.0637 0.2453 -0.26 0.795
Appellate Review -0.3242 0.2013 -1.61 0.107
Solicitor General-Amicus-Vaidate -0.6389 0.1804 -3.54 0.000*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Invalidate 0.2213 0.2723 0.81 0.416
Federal Court Invalidates -0.7796 0.2400 -3.25 0.001*
State Court Validates -0.5064 0.2311 -2.19 0.028*
State Court Invalidates -. 0674 0.2656 -4.02 0.000*
One State in Favor -0.2549 0.2809 -0.91 0.364
2-10 States in Favor 0.5555 0.2690 2.07 0.039*
11-29 States in Favor -0.1786 0.1945 -0.92 0-359
30+ States in Favor -0.0076 03560 -0.02 0.983
States Opposing 0.2968 0.4444 0.67 0.504
Interest Group Amicus -0.1533 02191 -0.70 0.484
Free Speech -0.1699 0.3196 -0.53 0.595
Free Speech x Liberal State Action 0.1514 0.5705 0.27 0.791
Equal Protection 0.0668 0.4307 0.16 0.877
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action -0.0178 0.6529 -0.03 0.978
Voting -0.2028 0.6562 -0.31 0.757
Voting x Liberal State Action 0.6837 0.8565 0.80 0.425
Commercial/Property 0.1679 03636 0A6 0.644
Religion 0.5207 0.4772 1.09 0.275
Religion x Liberal State Action 0.1851 0.9867 0.19 0.851
Substantive Due Process -0.2926 0.4371 -0.67 0.503
Criminal -0.4801 0.2917 -1.65 0.100
Preemption 0.3983 0.3486 1.14 0.253
Constant 0.8266 0.3504 2.36 0.018*
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REHNQUIST (1986-2001)
VARIABLE NAME COEFF. TD. Z P>IZI
Liberal State Action 0.4547 0.2439 1.86 0.062
Appellate Review -0.1387 0.2215 -0.63 0.531
Solicitor General-Anicus-Validate -0.3898 0.1990 -1.96 0.050
Solicitor General-Amicus-Invalidate 0.2003 0.2634 0.76 0.447
Federal Court Invalidates -0.8013 0.2485 -3.22 0.001*
State Court Validates -0.2349 0.2288 -1.03 0305
State Court Invalidates -0.8466 0.2749 -3.08 0.002*
One State in Favor -0.1695 0.2930 -0.58 0.563
2-10 States in Favor 0.2687 0.2606 1.03 0303
11-29 States in Favor -0.1160 0.2074 -0.56 0.576
30+ States in Favor 0.4279 03538 1.21 0.227
States Opposing -0.1750 0.4719 -0.37 0.711
Interest Group Amicus -0.3029 0.2320 -1.31 0.192
Free Speech 0.2718 0.3413 0.80 0.426
Free Speech x Liberal State Action -0.9750 0.5868 -1.66 0.097
Equal Protection 0.2518 0.4423 0.57 0,569
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action -0.4728 0.6594 -0.72 0.473
Voting 0.6198 0.6986 0.89 0375
Voting x Liberal State Action 0.1384 0.8508 0.16 0.871
Commercial/Property -0.1545 0.3757 -0.41 0.681
Religion -0.1916 0.5092 -0.38 0.707
Religion x Liberal State Action 1.1311 0.9605 1.18 0.239
Substantive Due Process -0.0527 0.4769 -0.11 0.912
Criminal -0.2941 0.3094 -0.95 0342
Preemption L1233 0.3629 3.10 0.002*






VARIABLE NAME COEFF. Z P>Izl
ERROR
Liberal State Action 0.4179 0.2317 1.80 0.071
Appellate Review 0.2771 0.2040 1.36 0.174
Solicitor General-Amicus-Validate -0.3750 0.1838 -2.04 0.041*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Iavalidate 0.4001 0.2679 1.49 0.135
Federal Court Invalidates -0.5914 0.2413 -2.45 0.014*
State Court Validates -0.0691 0.2256 -0.31 0.759
State Court Invalidates -0.9756 0.2711 -3.60 0.000*
One State in Favor -0.0241 0.2728 -0.09 0.930
2-10 States in Favor -0.0108 02639 -0.04 0.967
11-29 States in Favor -0.1235 0.2011 -0.61 0.539
30+ States in Favor 1.0255 0.3542 2.90 0.004*
States Opposing -0.3050 0.4493 -0.68 0.497
Interest Group Amicus -0.3965 0.2342 -1.69 0.090
Free Speech 0.1389 0.3284 0.42 0.672
Free Speech x Liberal State Action -0.3419 0-5298 -0.65 0.519
Equal Protection -0.1140 0.4326 -0.26 0.792
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action 0.0143 0.6554 0.02 0.983
Voting 0.8930 0.5062 1.76 0.078
CommerciallProperty 0.2392 0.3615 0.66 0.508
Religion -0.1144 0.4885 -0.23 0.815
Religion x Liberal State Action 0.6798 0.9115 0.75 0.456
Substantive Due Process -0.6953 0.5249 -1.32 0.185
Criminal -0.2813 0.2987 -0.94 0.346
Preemption 0.8520 03564 2.39 0.017*
Constant -0.0763 0.3506 -0.22 0.828
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SCALIA (1991-2001) (AFTER TiioMAs JOINED THE COURT)
VARIABLE COEFF. RROR Z AzI
Liberal State Action 1.3650 0.3435 3.97 0.000"
Solicitor General-Amicus-Validate -0.1414 0.3070 0.46 0.645
Solicitor General-Amicus-Iuvalidate 0.7925 0.4432 1.79 0.074
Federal Court Invalidates -1.1056 0.3167 -3.49 0.000"
Federal Court Validates -0.2662 0.3155 -0.84 0.399
State Court Invalidates -1.6021 04485 -3.57 0.000*
One State in Favor 0.2251 0.5092 0.44 0.658
2-10 States in Favor -0.2433 0.3689 -0.66 0.510
11-29 States in Favor -0.4031 03105 -1.30 0.194
30+ States in Favor 1.3091 0.5394 2.43 0.015"
States Opposing -0.6106 0.7735 -0.79 0.430
Interest Group Amicus -0.2974 0.3388 -0.88 0.380
Free Speech 1.0669 0.5045 2.11 0.034*
Equal Protection 0.2054 0.6651 0.31 0.757
Liberal State Action x Equal Protection -1.3838 0.9970 -1.39 0.165
Voting 0.9183 0.6638 1.38 0.167
Commercial/Property 0.0615 0.5308 0.12 0.908
Religion 0.9716 0.7004 1.39 0.165
Criminal 0.2517 0.4677 0.54 0.590
Preemption 2.5095 0.6872 3.65 0.000"





VARIABLE NAME COEFF. ERROR Z P>I
Liberal State Action -0.7332 03008 -2.44 0.015*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Validate -0.6863 0.2281 -3.01 0.003*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Invalidate 0.5518 03790 1.46 0.145
Federal Court Invalidates -0.2430 0.2947 -0.82 0.410
State Court Validates 0.1566 0.2821 0.55 0.579
State Court Invalidates -0.3782 0.3361 -1.13 0.260
One State in Favor 0.2484 0.4345 0.57 0.567
2-10 States in Favor 0.4531 03407 1.33 0.183
11-29 States in Favor -0.3841 02280 -1.68 0.092
30+ States in Favor 0.5444 0.4549 1.20 0.231
Interest Group Amicus -0.4550 0.2889 -1.57 0.115
Free Speech -0.2598 03747 -0.69 0.488
Equal Protection -0.1092 0.5901 -0.19 0.853
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action -0.7624 0.9614 -0.79 0.428
Voting 0.0290 0.8121 0.04 0.971
Voting x Liberal State Action -1.1973 1.0259 -1.17 0.243
CommerciallProperty -0.0207 0.4509 -0.05 0.963
Substantive Due Process -0.5364 0.6136 -0.87 0.382
Criminal -0.5459 0.3516 -1.55 0.121
Preemption 0.1166 0.4586 0.25 0.799
Constant 1.0043 0.4044 2.48 0.013*
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STEVENS (1986-2001)
VARIABLE NAME COEFF. ERROR z P>Izl
Liberal State Action -0.7263 0.2325 -3.12 0.002*
Appellate Review -0.1723 0.1950 -0.88 0.377
Solicitor General-Amicus-Validate -0.4665 0.1721 -2.71 0.007*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Invalidate -0.0861 0.2869 -0.30 0.764
Federal Court Invalidates 0.0678 0.2595 0.26 0.794
State Court Validates 0.0020 02512 0.01 0.994
State Court Invalidates -0.5613 0.2722 -2.06 0.039*
One State in Favor 0.6649 0.3114 2.14 0.033*
2-10 States in Favor 0.5554 0.2925 1.90 0.058
11-29 States in Favor 0.0226 0.1914 0.12 0.906
30+ States in Favor 0.6976 0.3824 1.82 0.068
States Opposing 1.6591 0.7723 2.15 0.032*
Interest Group Amicus -0.4072 0.2184 -1.86 0,062
Free Speech 0.2122 0.3227 0.66 0.511
Free Speech x Liberal State Action -1.0533 0.5996 -1.76 0.079
Equal Protection 0.7894 0.5120 1.54 0.123
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action 0.3706 0.8182 0.45 0.651
Voting -0.8024 0.5249 -1.53 0.126
Commercial/Property 0.4204 0.3563 1.18 0.238
Religion 0.8267 0.5391 1.53 0.125
Religion x Liberal State Action -1.0113 0.8880 -1.14 0.255
Substantive Due Process -0.5116 0.4852 -1.05 0.292
Substantive Due Process x Liberal State 0.8218 1.0215 0.80 0.421
Action
Criminal 0.6360 0.2940 2.16 0.031*
Preemption 0.2017 0.3398 0.59 0.553






VARIABLE NAE COEFF. STD. z P>IzIERROR
Liberal State Action 1.1079 0.3302 3.36 0.001*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Validate 0.1670 0.2939 0-57 0-570
Solicitor General-Amicus-Invalidate 1.0113 0.4432 2.28 0.022*
Federal Court Invalidates -1.1749 0.3421 -3.43 0.001*
State Court Validates 0.1668 0.3167 0.53 0.598
State Court Invalidates -0.8869 0.4232 -2.10 0.036*
One State in Favor 0.2583 0.4864 0.53 0.595
2-10 States in Favor -0.1393 03669 -0.38 0.704
11-29 States in Favor -0.0600 0.2974 -0.20 0.840
30+ States in Favor 0.2616 0.4903 0.53 0594
States Opposing -1.0223 0.7531 -1.36 0.175
Interest Group Amicus -0.0516 0.3319 -0.16 0.877
Free Speech 0.7982 0.5697 1.40 0.161
Equal Protection 0.1625 0.7325 0.22 0.824
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action -1.4475 0.9993 -1.45 0.147
Voting 0.7882 0.6623 1.19 0.234
Commercial/Property -0.2977 0.5512 -0.54 0.589
Religion 0.7525 0.7388 1.02 0308
Substantive Due Process 0.3164 0.8190 0.39 0.699
Criminal -0.1689 0.5178 -0.33 0.744
Preemption 1.6246 0.6298 2.58 0.010*
Constant -0.5078 0.5786 -0.88 0.380
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WHrr (1986-1993)
VARIABLE NAME COEFF. ERO Z PAzI
Liberal State Action -0.5511 03565 -1.55 0.122
Appellate Review 0.1429 02463 0.58 0.562
Solicitor General-Amicus-Vafidate -0.5535 0.2343 -2.36 0.018*
Solicitor General-Amicus-Invalidate 0.6864 0.3965 1.73 0.083
Federal Court Invalidates -0.6065 0.3415 -1.78 0.076
State Court Validates 0.1271 0,3249 0.39 0.696
State Court Invalidates -0.2639 0.3484 -0.76 0.449
One State in Favor 0.1767 0.3455 0.51 0.609
2-10 States in Favor 0.8897 0.3817 2.33 0.020*
11-29 States in Favor 0.4260 0.2614 1.63 0.103
30+ States in Favor 0.9386 0.4541 2.07 0.039*
States Opposing 0.8635 0.6079 1.42 0.155
Interest Group Amicus -0.8847 0.3324 -2.66 0.008*
Free Speech -0.1598 0.4050 -0.39 0.693
Free Speech x Liberal State Action -0.5601 0.8246 -0.68 0.497
Equal Protection 0.0348 0.5737 0.06 0.952
Equal Protection x Liberal State Action -0.2153 0.8219 -0.26 0.793
Voting 0.0481 0.8766 0.05 0.956
Commercial/Property 0.6669 0.5368 1.24 0.214
Religion 0.0057 0.5529 0.01 0.992
Substantive Due Process -1.4688 0.7111 -2.07 0.039*
Liberal State Action x Substantive Due
2.1135 1.1790 1.79 0.073Process_________
Criminal -0.7921 0.3714 -2.13 0.033*
Preemption 12109 0.5365 2.26 0.024*
Constant 0.2019 0A614 0.44 0.662
1386
